Western University

Scholarship@Western
Master of Laws Research Papers Repository

Law School

August 2019

A Review of the Proposals for Taxation of Profits of Businesses in
the Digitalized Economy
Chukwuebuka Stanley Ndibe
The University of Western Ontario

Supervisor: Professor Colin Campbell
University of Western Ontario

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/llmp
Part of the Taxation-Transnational Commons, and the Tax Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Ndibe, Chukwuebuka Stanley, "A Review of the Proposals for Taxation of Profits of Businesses in the
Digitalized Economy" (2019). Master of Laws Research Papers Repository. 5.
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/llmp/5

This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Scholarship@Western. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Master of Laws Research Papers Repository by an authorized administrator of
Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact wlswadmin@uwo.ca.

A REVIEW OF THE PROPOSALS FOR TAXATION OF PROFITS OF
BUSINESSES IN THE DIGITALIZED ECONOMY

ABSTRACT
The advent of information technology and digitalization has changed and continues to
change everyday life, including the manner in which business operations are carried out.
Years back, to run a taxi business, you would need to own vehicles and employ drivers.
Today, some digitalized businesses are able to operate the same business by just owning a
digital interface and related intellectual property rights. This change in the way things are
done has significant impact on traditional legal systems. In the realm of tax law,
digitalization has impacted on traditional international tax rules including the threshold for
allocating taxing rights. In. this paper, the author presents a broad review of the main
current issues regarding allocation of taxing rights, and the different solutions that have
been proposed to accommodate digitalization in the international tax system. In terms of
structure, this paper shall proceed as follows. Section 1 is the introduction. Section 2 will
review the germane aspects of the current PE concept. Section 3 will examine the nature
of digitalized business models which are the subjects of international discussions in this
area. Section 4 will review the efforts that have been made at the international level at
taxing digital businesses, and highlight the critical points of these efforts. The scope of this
work will focus on the ongoing discussions regarding direct taxation of the digital
economy. Indirect taxation of the digital economy may be referred to when necessary but
will not be reviewed in any detail.
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INTRODUCTION

Taxation is an overt character of sovereignty.1 International law recognizes a sovereign’s
right to prescribe laws and exert its jurisdiction based on two main factors – nationality and
territoriality.2 However, taxing jurisdiction follows a somewhat special set of attributes.
While territoriality is relevant for determining jurisdiction both under general international
law and under international tax law, nationality is often irrelevant. Aside the United States,
there is no other country that exercise taxing jurisdiction based on nationality.3 Generally,
under international tax jurisprudence, a sovereign has the jurisdiction to impose and
enforce its tax laws mostly based on territoriality. First, a sovereign may impose tax on
residents of its territory for activities performed within and outside its territory.4 This is
known as residence-based taxation.5 A sovereign may also exercise taxing jurisdiction
over activities of residents of other countries for activities within its territory. This is known
as source-based taxation.

The two taxing jurisdictions referred to above would have posed no challenges if they were
exercised in parallel. However, globalization triggered situations where a person is
frequently subject to both residence and source-based taxation, thereby incurring double
tax liability, a phenomenon that is general considered to be an obstacle to international
trade and investment.6 To avoid double taxation, governments entered into anti-double tax
treaties, and in these treaties adopted the Permanent Establishment (“PE”) concept as a
means of allocating taxing rights based on the residence and source jurisdictions.7 The PE
concept which is largely characterized by its physical and tangible nature was adopted in
1

United States of America v Harden, 1963 C (available on http://canlii.ca/t/21vdg).
Reuven S Avi-Yonah, “International Tax as International Law” PublicLaw Leg Theory Res Pap No41 1.
3
Bernard Schneider, “The End of Taxation Without End: A New Tax Regime For U.S. Expatriates” (2012)
32:1 Va Tax Rev 1 at 3.
4
Kevin J Holmes, International Tax Policy and Double Tax Treaties: An Introduction to Principles and
Application, second revised edition ed (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2014) at 19.
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Ibid.
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Yasin Uslu, “An Analysis of ‘Google Taxes’ in the Context of Action 7 of the OECD/G20 Base Erosion
and Profit Shifting Initiative” (2018) 72:No. 4a/Special Issue Bull Intl Taxn 1 at 1.
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the first model tax treaty released by the League of Nations in 19278, a period long before
the advent of technology and digitalization.

The advent of technology and increase in cross border trade activities occasioned
substantial tension on territorial jurisdiction in the sense that the practical line of distinction
between territories is blurred. This tension also applied to tax sovereignty given its
territorial scope. In particular, following the advent of information technology and digital
revolution, the PE concept designed for allocation of taxing jurisdictions became
inadequate. The intangible feature of digitalization makes it easier for technologically
advanced businesses to remotely access a global market without having a physical presence
in the market.9 As noted by Cockfield: “digital goods and services can be transferred in
near-costless fashion across a border and ‘exist’ for tax purposes within another country or
subnational state”.10

One would imagine that, given that digitalized businesses have existed for some time now,
the international tax laws would have evolved accordingly. This is however not the case as
the PE concept in tax treaties has largely maintained its essential physical character to
date.11 One explanation for the consistent application of the old PE rules to the digital
economy could be the fact that law making is mostly slow while technological
advancement occurs at a much faster pace.12 Another explanation could be the political
tussle that it raises, which is substantially a consequence of the fact that the current state of
international rules is in favor of the jurisdictions that have the most technologically
advanced corporations.

8

Arvid Aage Skaar, Permanent establishment: erosion of a tax treaty principle, Series on international
taxation 13 (Deventer ; Boston: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1991) at 82.
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Arthur J Cockfield et al, Taxing global digital commerce (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law
International, 2013) at 4.
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Ibid.
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Uslu, supra note 6 at 1; Marie Sapirie, “Permanent Establishment and the Digital Economy” (2018) 72:4
Bull Int Tax 1 at 1.
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Subhajit Basu, Global perspectives on E-commerce taxation law, Markets and the law (Burlington, VT:
Ashgate, 2007) at 1.
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Nevertheless, there have been some efforts by governments at the international level to
address the challenges that have arisen from digitalization. The first global effort at taxing
activities conducted over the internet was the meeting of the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) member states in Turku, Finland in 1997.13 This
meeting which, merely set out an agenda for tackling the challenges of e-commerce, was
followed by a more robust meeting in Ottawa, Ontario in 1998.14 At the 1998 meeting in
Ottawa, the OECD members states reached consensus on an agreement for the taxation of
e-commerce. The agreement which was popularly tagged the Ottawa Taxation Framework
primarily noted that e-commerce should be taxed within the scope of traditional
international tax rules.15 The Ottawa Taxation Framework set out the following principles
for the taxation of e-commerce: (i) neutrality in taxing e-commerce and the traditional
commerce, (ii) efficiency or low administrative cost, (iii) certainty and simplicity, (iv)
fairness and by producing the right amount of tax at the right time and limiting tax
avoidance opportunities, (v) flexibility of the regime to follow developments in
technology.16

Premised on the aforementioned principles, the OECD updated its commentary to the PE
concept to address its definition for the purpose of e-commerce.17 However, as would be
disclosed in more details in this work, the revision largely applied the same physical
attributes of the traditional PE concept.18 As a result, the challenges posed by the
technology persisted, more so as technology advanced and became more dematerialized.

Digitalization and advancement in technology did not only render source taxation porous
and ineffective, it also created an avenue for substantial tax planning and avoidance. As a
result of this and similar challenges, stakeholders at the international level reached a near
consensus that the current international tax system require some amendments to efficiently
13

Cockfield et al, supra note 9 at 115.
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tax highly digitalized corporations.19 In response to this challenge, the OECD at the request
of the G20 countries, produced a report titled “Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit
Shifting” (BEPS Action Plan) in 2013, which detailed fifteen (15) action plans to combat
base erosion. Action 1 of the BEPS Action Plan was designated to “Address the tax
challenges of the digital economy” by identifying “the main difficulties that the digital
economy poses for the application of existing international tax rules and develop detailed
options to address these difficulties, taking a holistic approach and considering both direct
and indirect taxation”.20 Although the BEPS was originally intended to address base
erosion by multinational corporations leveraging on technology, the project again
reactivated the concern of the international community regarding the current international
principles for allocation of taxing rights; particularly the PE concept.21
In September 2014, the OECD’s Task Force on the Digital Economy (TFDE) presented its
interim report and subsequently, a final report was presented in 2015. In the 2015 report,
the TFDE reviewed the nature of highly digitalized business models and recognized the
need to review the extant PE rules with a view to adapting it to the digitalized businesses.
Subsequently, in a 2018 report, the OECD reemphasized the need to reevaluate the current
nexus and attribution rules considering the impacts of digitalization on the economy and
value creation.22 In May 2019, the TFDE released a public consultation paper titled:
“Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digitalisation of the Economy”23 and subsequently,
“Programme of Work to Develop a Consensus Solution to the Tax Challenges Arising from

Raffaele Pertuzzi & Vasiliki Koukoulioti, “The European Commission’s Proposal on Corporate Taxation
and Significant Digital Presence: A Preliminary Assessment” (2018) 58:9 Eur Tax 391 at 391.
20
OECD, “Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting”, online: OECD ILibrary <https://read.oecdilibrary.org/taxation/action-plan-on-base-erosion-and-profit-shifting_9789264202719-en> at 14.
21
Daniel Blum, “Permanent Establishments and Action 1 on the Digital Economy of the OECD Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting Initiative – The Nexus Criterion Redefined?” (2015) 69:6/7 Bull Int Tax 314 at
316.
22
OECD, Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation – Interim Report 2018: Inclusive Framework on
BEPS, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (OECD, 2018) at 172.
23
OECD, “Public Consultation Document: Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digitalization of the
Economy”, (2019), online: OECD ILibrary <http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/public-consultation-documentaddressing-the-tax-challenges-of-the-digitalisation-of-the-economy.pdf>.
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the Digitalization of the Economy”.24 Both documents provided further analysis on the
proposals for taxing the digital economy, specifically a revision of the nexus and profit
allocation rules for source taxation.

The OECD is not the only body that proposed rules for tackling challenges posed by
digitalization to the traditional system of taxation. The European Commission (EC) also
considered these issues and its implications for members of the European Union (EU). In
2018, the EC released two proposals that seek to address the challenges posed by the digital
economy – the first being proposals for source corporate taxation based on a “significant
digital presence” nexus, and the other a proposal for a common system of digital service
tax.25 The first proposal was designed to confront the digital economy within the confines
of the tax treaties, while the second was designed as an interim unilateral domestic measure
pending when global consensus is reached on the issues.26 However, the EC’s efforts failed
because member states failed to reach unanimous agreement on the proposals.27

The objective of this paper is to review and assess the efforts that have been made so far
by the OECD within the scope of the BEPS, the EC’s efforts as well as unilateral measures
adopted by some countries for the purpose of ensuring equitable taxation of the digital
economy. The paper will set out in a big picture perspective the complexities of the digital
economy, the issues that it raises for existing PE rules, how these issues have been
considered in international debates, and possible postulations regarding what the future
could hold for international tax law in this area.

OECD, “Programme of Work to Develop a Consensus Solution to the Tax Challenges Arising from the
Digitalisation of the Economy”, (2019), online: OECD ILibrary
<https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/programme-of-work-to-develop-a-consensus-solution-to-the-taxchallenges-arising-from-the-digitalisation-of-the-economy.htm>.
25
Pertuzzi & Koukoulioti, supra note 19 at 391.
26
Marie Lamensch, “Digital Services Tax: A Critical Analysis and Comparison with the VAT System”
(2019) 59:6 Eur Tax at 1–2.
27
Lomas Ullrika, “EU Drops Digital Tax Plans”, (2019), online: Tax-News <https://www.taxnews.com/news/EU_Drops_Digital_Tax_Plans____97044.html>.
24
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2

THE PE AS AN APPARATUS FOR ALLOCATION OF INTERNATIONAL
TAXING RIGHTS
Evolution of the PE

A good starting point for this paper is to clearly set out the principle that underlies the
current PE concept. As stated earlier, the PE concept is a recognized apparatus under
international tax law for allocating taxing rights among residence and source jurisdictions.
However, the PE concept did not emanate first in international law. 28 Historically, the
concept was first used in the 19th century in the Industrial Code of Prussia, Germany to
denote a place of business activity for German business law purposes.29 The concept which
was originally known as “Bestriebsstatte” evolved to become a tax principle for preventing
double taxation among Prussia’s municipalities in the middle of the 19th century.30 For a
“place of business” to give rise to source taxation by a municipality, it must be a fixed
location in that municipality, and “it had to be possible to recognize the enterprise’s
intentions to go on performing the business activity at this place”.31
In the late 19th century and early 20th century, international trade increased, and this gave
rise to increased inter-state double taxation.32 The intrastate and municipal anti double tax
statutes proved insufficient to address this challenge, giving rise to the coming into force
of inter-state double tax treaties. The first of this kind was the Convention between the
Governments of Austria-Hungary and Prussia in 1899.33 The Austria-Hungary and Prussia
inter-state tax convention retained the twin elements applicable to the Bestriebsstatte to
wit: fixed location and a visible intention to carry on business.34

The PE concept did not gain worldwide prominence until after the First World War when
the League of Nations set up a committee of experts to undertake a study of the theoretical
28

Skaar, supra note 8 at 72.
Ibid.
30
Ibid at 73.
31
Ibid.
32
Ibid at 75.
33
Ibid.
34
Ibid.
29
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principles for allocating taxing rights.35 This was necessitated by the need to reduce double
taxation which had at the time increased as a result of the revenue needs of countries
following the world war.36 The committee of experts presented a report expressing the view
that economic allegiance principle should be the basis for allocating taxing rights. 37 The
committee identified four elements of the economic allegiance principle: (i) the origin of
wealth, (ii) the location of wealth, (iii) the place of right to enforcement, and (iv) the
residence or place of consumption.38 The committee selected residence or place of
consumption and origin or source of wealth as the most policy compelling bases for
international taxation under the economic allegiance principle.39 The committee however
recommended that the country of residence should have exclusive jurisdiction because it
was a more practical option. According to the committee “a state cannot successfully tax a
foreigner, only shut him out”.40

However, further review undertaken by the League of Nations revealed that source taxation
was already supported in existing bilateral tax treaties, and “as far as income from
commercial or industrial activities was concerned, source-state taxation was accepted if the
enterprise had a branch, an agency, an establishment, a stable commercial or industrial
organization, or a permanent representative”.41 This was the turning point for reliance on
the PE concept in tax treaties as a basis for source taxation; a principle that have survived
several amendments and have been retained in different revisions of double tax treaties42,
including the OECD Model Tax Convention (“OECD MTC”) first developed in 1963.43
This was effected without prejudice to the primary preference for residence-based taxation.

35

Ibid at 79.
Michael Kobetsky, International taxation of permanent establishments: principles and policy,
Cambridge tax law series (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011) at 111.
37
Benjamin Hoffart, “Permanent Establishment in the Digital Age: Improving and Stimulating Debate
Through an Access to Markets Proxy Approach” (2007) 6:1 Northwest J Technol Intellect Prop 18.
38
Kobetsky, supra note 36 at 112.
39
Ibid.
40
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Ibid at 82.
42
Ibid at 82–95.
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Kobetsky, supra note 36 at 150.
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According to Reimer, Schmid and Orell, the PE concept was introduced in tax treaties to
achieve three main objectives.44 First, to ensure tax fairness and justice to the source states
in recognition of its efforts to create and maintain good economic condition and
environment for the foreign enterprise’s business.45 Second, the PE concept is also
intended to place the business of the foreign enterprise on the same standard and thereby
maintain neutrality between them.46 The PE concept together with the exemption method
in Article 23A(I) OECD MTC ensures capital import neutrality. 47 Third, is the practical
justification that the PE concept restrains unconditional source based taxation which would
have had the negative effect of impeding international exchange and trade.48

The basic PE definition
Currently, the PE concept as found in the OECD MTC 2017 plays the same role and is
substantially of the same character as that originally designed by the League of Nations. 49
Under the current OECD MTC, the basic rule is that an enterprise is liable to pay income
tax in the country where it is resident.50 An enterprise would not be liable to pay tax on
profits made from a source country unless it has a PE; a “real and significant or substantial
economic nexus with the country in which the profits arise”.51 Even when this is the case,
the profit of the foreign enterprise that would be subject to tax is the profit that is
attributable to a PE in the source state.52 This principle which can be found in Article 7(1)
OECD MTC, represents a codification of the historical preference for residence-based

44

Ekkehart Reimer et al, eds, Permanent establishments: a domestic taxation, bilateral tax treaty and
OECD perspective, third edition ed (Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International,
2014) at 11.
45
Ibid.
46
Ibid at 12.
47
Ibid.
48
Ibid at 12–13.
49
Kobetsky, supra note 36 at 150. “Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Condensed Version
2017 | READ online”, online: OECD ILibrary <https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/model-taxconvention-on-income-and-on-capital-condensed-version-2017_mtc_cond-2017-en>.
50
Holmes, supra note 4 at 151–152.
51
Ibid at 152.
52
Reimer et al, supra note 44 at 137.
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taxation. The PE definition is important to allocation of business profit53, for capital gains
from moveable assets attributed to a PE54 and for source taxation of dividends, interest,
royalties and other income55 which guarantees taxation in the PE state if the underlying
value of the mentioned types of income can be allocated to the PE.56

Article 5 OECD MTC laid down the principle for determining what qualifies as PE. The
Article defines a PE as “a fixed place of business through which the business of an
enterprise is wholly or partly carried on”. The PE definition has the following elements:
(i) a Place, (ii) fixation or permanence, (iii) business activity, and (iv) integration.
The place of business element requires that a PE must be a physical tangible place.57 This
element has been referred to in literature as the cornerstone of the PE concept.58 The
requirement for a fixed place serves not only as the basis for the distributive rules in Article
7, but also for other distributive rules in the OECD MTC.59 The place of business need not
be a building; it can be any substantial physical object that can sustain a business activity
in a commercial manner.60 Fixation requires that the place of business is linked to a specific
geographic point in the source state.61 However, in the case of business activities located
in different places in the source jurisdiction that by their nature require movement from
location to location, the requirement for fixation is satisfied if the business has geographical
and commercial coherence.62 Intangible properties cannot qualify as a PE under the extant
laws; they can only form a part of a constituted PE.63
53

Article 7, OECD MTC
Article 13, OECD MTC
55
Article 10(4), 11(4), 12(13) and 21(2) OECD MTC
56
Andreas Waltrich, Cross-border taxation of permanent establishments: an international comparison,
Series on International taxation volume 59 (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2016) at 13.
57
Ekkehart Reimer, Alexander Rust & Klaus Vogel, eds, Klaus Vogel on double taxation conventions,
fourth edition ed (Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2015) at 337.
58
Ibid at 336.
59
Jean Schaffner, How fixed is a permanent establishment?, Series on international taxation v. 42 (Alphen
aan den Rijn, The Netherlands : Frederick, MD: Kluwer Law International ; Sold and distributed in North,
Central and South American by Aspen Publishers, 2013) at 123.
60
Reimer, Rust, & Vogel, supra note 57 at 337.
61
Waltrich, supra note 56 at 15.
62
Ibid.
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Reimer, Rust, & Vogel, supra note 57 at 337.
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Although the basic definition of a PE requires meeting the conditions of geographical
fixation, there are some provisions in the OECD MTC that deem a PE to exist even in the
absence of a fixed place of business. These exceptions are found in Article 5(3) of the
OECD MTC which provides for construction sites PE, and Article 5(5) of the OECD MTC
which provides for the dependent agent PE. The reason behind both exceptions is to prevent
businesses from avoiding tax by artificially carrying out business in a source state without
having a fixed place of business.64 With respect to Article 5(5), a PE is created where a
person who is not an independent agent acts on behalf of the foreign enterprise and has the
enterprise’s authority to conclude contracts in its name, and exercises this authority
habitually. Article 5(3) MTC provides that a building or construction or installation project
would constitute a PE if and only if it lasts longer than twelve months.
In addition to being fixed and tangible, a PE must have some degree of permanence.65
According to Commentary No.5 of the OECD Commentary on Article 5, the requirement
for fixation signifies a link to a specific and distinct geographical point.66 The requirement
for fixation does not mean forever; rather it is best understood as “not temporary”.67 This
accord with the third policy objective of a PE as identified by Reimer, Schmid and Orell.
In essence, permanence ensures that source taxation is not unconditional or unlimited.

Another important element is that the foreign enterprise must carry on business through
the PE before it would trigger source taxation. The element serves to distinguish between
passive income that are taxed at source and active income. 68 Consequently, a business is
defined as every active income generating activity. 69 Notwithstanding, passive activities
may qualify as business if they are a component of active business activity. 70

64

Holmes, supra note 4 at 61.
Ibid at 153.
66
Reimer, Rust, & Vogel, supra note 57 at 345.
67
Holmes, supra note 4 at 153.
68
Reimer et al, supra note 44 at 37–38.
69
Reimer, Rust, & Vogel, supra note 57 at 340.
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The last basic requirement is that the PE must be at the disposal of the foreign enterprise
or its staff.71 Disposal refers to the ability of the foreign enterprise to control and use the
place of business at will for the purpose of carrying on the business.72 Control required
could be legal or factual control.73

Article 5(2) of the OECD MTC sets out a non-exhaustive list of what would suffice as a
PE and they are: (a) a place of management, (b) a branch, (c) an office, (d) a factory, (e) a
workshop, and (f) a mine, an oil or gas well. However, to qualify as a PE, these examples
necessarily have to meet the conditions expressed above.

Article 5(4) of the OECD definition of PE contains a negative list of what would not qualify
as a PE. These include facilities used for storage, display, maintenance of goods belonging
to a resident, etc. The items in the list are commonly denominated by their preparatory or
auxiliary nature.74 The policy objective behind this is to ensure that source jurisdiction is
activated only when the foreign enterprise has a sufficient economic presence in the source
state.75

2.2.1

The Server PE

The OECD introduced the Server PE in its commentary to Article 5 OECD MTC, following
the principles adopted in the Ottawa Taxation Framework.76 The commentary largely
maintained the physical nature of the PE concept and requires the existence of most of the
elements described above. This is consistent with the objective of the OECD at the time to
ensure that e-commerce is taxed within the traditional framework. In OECD’s view, a
website in itself does not constitute a PE.77 However, a server on which the website is

71

Reimer, Rust, & Vogel, supra note 57 at 352.
Waltrich, supra note 56 at 16.
73
Ibid.
74
Holmes, supra note 4 at 158.
75
Ibid at 159.
76
Cockfield et al, supra note 9 at 117.
77
Ibid.
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hosted would constitute a PE if (i) it is a tangible property and (ii) if it has a geographical
location, (iii) and some degree of permanence.78

Assuming that a server constitutes a PE, the next determination is whether the server is at
the disposal of the foreign enterprise.79 The test is same with the traditional establishments
only that in this case, the presence of personnel is not relevant. 80 Finally, to fully trigger
source tax jurisdiction, the foreign enterprise must carry on its business through the
server.81

It is important to note that even when a server apparently constitutes a PE, it would have
to be determined whether the activities for which the PE is used is auxiliary or preparatory
in line with Article 5(4) OECD MTC.82 If this is the case, then a PE would be deemed not
to exist.

Allocation of profit to the PE
Under current source tax principles, after the PE threshold issues are determined, and a
foreign enterprise is found to have a PE in the source state, the next consideration is to
determine the quantum of profit that could be attributable to the PE. This is the case
because, as noted above, Article 7(1) of the OECD MTC preserves the historical supremacy
of residence-based taxation, and source taxing jurisdiction is limited to the profits
attributable to the PE.83
Article 7(2) OECD MTC provides the details for determining a PE’s profit for the purpose
of complying with the principle in Article 7(1) OECD MTC. Article 7(2) relies on the
fiction that the PE is separate and independent from the foreign enterprise that carries on
business through the PE, and applies the arms-length principle to determine the PE’s profit
78

Ibid; Holmes, supra note 4 at 168.
Holmes, supra note 4 at 168.
80
Ibid at 169; Cockfield et al, supra note 9 at 119.
81
Cockfield et al, supra note 9 at 117.
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Ibid at 118.
83
Reimer, Rust, & Vogel, supra note 57 at 479–480.
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in transactions between the PE and the foreign parent enterprise, associated enterprises and
third parties.84 The Article provides that the PE’s profit is the profit which it would have
been expected to make if it was a separate and independent enterprise engaged in the same
or similar activities under the same or similar conditions, taking into account the functions
performed, assets used and risks assumed.85

The current provision of the old Article 7(2) OECD MTC is based on the Authorized
OECD Approach (AOA). The AOA is a creation of a 2008 report by the OECD which
pescribes the method for applying the arms-length principle in Article 7(2) OECD MTC.86
The AOA retained the already existing arms-length principle, but proceeded further to treat
the PE as a “functional” separate entity capable of owning assets and assuming risks, in
line with the transfer pricing principles in the OECD’s Transfer Pricing Guideline.87 The
functional separate entity approach introduced by the AOA involves a two-step analysis –
a factual and functional analysis, and arms-length valuation of internal dealings.88

First, under a factual and functional analysis, profit is allocated to the PE based on the risks
it bears which is a product of the functions performed by the PE and assets attributed to
those functions.89 This first stage reinforces the basic requirement that the PE must indeed
engage in an active business involving significant people’s function. The second stage of
analysis requires that internal dealings between the PE and the foreign enterprise, including
associated enterprises are priced at an arms-length applying the OECD Transfer Pricing
Guideline.90
In determining the PE’s profit under Article 7(2), whether in respect of dealings with the
foreign enterprise, with other permanent establishments or with associated enterprises,

84

Kobetsky, supra note 36 at 361.
Reimer, Rust, & Vogel, supra note 57 at 480.
86
Uslu, supra note 6 at 4.
87
Waltrich, supra note 56 at 37.
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Ibid at 36–37.
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arm’s-length deductions are allowed to the PE for the purpose of determining its profits.91
The quantum of deductions is a matter of domestic law. However, the OECD commentary
to Article 24 requires amongst other things that expenses be allowed deductions in the same
manner as the source jurisdiction allows its residents.92

3

DISRUPTION OF THE TRADITIONAL PE RULE BY DIGITALIZATION
Introductory comments

The previous section of this paper clearly indicates that the PE concept is largely a concept
that is designed for a physical and tangible economy.93 The PE threshold requires a physical
or tangible place, and in addition, the place must be used by the enterprise to “carry on
business”. There is also no gainsaying that the service PE aimed at bringing e-commerce
within source jurisdiction was not particularly successful because of its physical character
requirement. Similarly, the profit allocation principles in Article 7(2) OECD MTC,
especially as expressed in the AOA complements the physical nature of the PE by
hypothesizing the PE as a separate entity and requiring a factual and functional analysis
before profit could be attributed to the PE. As would be seen in the next section of this
paper, the obvious feature of digitalization is its reliance on intangible assets and
minimization of human input. The immediate implication of this is that digitalized
businesses can circumvent the PE threshold to minimize or completely remove their
taxable presence and consequently diminish the tax base of source jurisdictions.94 As noted
by Sarfo: “the business world is now dominated by digital companies earning revenue in
jurisdictions where they do not have a physical presence, at times making it unclear where
the revenue-generating activity is taking place”.95

91

Reimer, Rust, & Vogel, supra note 57 at 484–485.
Ibid at 485.
93
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To properly appreciate the inadequacies of the current PE concept to the digitalized
economy, it is relevant to review in some details the nature of digitalized business models.
This paper will achieve this in the succeeding paragraphs by reviewing in details the key
features of highly digitalized businesses, and the types of digitalized business models
identified in Action 1 of the OECD’s BEPS project.

Key features of digitalized businesses
Action 1 of the OECD BEPS report 2015 identified the predominant features of digitalized
business models that pose challenges to the existing international source rules, which in
turn increases BEPS risks.96 The non-exhaustive list of key features include: (a) mobility,
(b) reliance on data, (c) network effects (which is understood with reference to user
participation), (d) use of multi-sided business models, (e) tendency toward monopoly or
oligopoly, and (f) volatility due to low barriers to entry and rapidly evolving technology.97
In the subsequent report of 2018, the OECD collapsed the features of these businesses
further into three, namely: (a) cross-jurisdictional scale without mass, (b) reliance upon
intangible assets and (c) data and user participation. The OECD’s views of these features
as expressed in the later report are summarised in the succeeding paragraphs.

Cross-jurisdictional scale without mass refers to the ability of digitalized business models
to leverage on technology to permeate jurisdictions without an actual physical presence.98
The OECD noted that whilst this is not a function of globalization, the trend has become
much more prevalent due to digitalization.99 This implies that although traditional
businesses can effectively operate in a jurisdiction without a substantial physical presence,
the highly digitalized businesses are better equipped and have more tendency to operate
without mass.
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With respect to the second feature, the OECD’s empirical research showed that intangible
assets often feature in the business models of digitalized businesses and constitute an
important value driver for these business models. The challenge posed by intangibles to
the existing international tax rules was clearly articulated in the OECD BEPS report 2015.
As noted in that report, the challenge posed by intangibles to existing nexus for source
taxation is that under extant rules, ownership of intangibles can be transferred and assigned
among associated enterprises in a manner that an enterprise can legally own an intangible
to the exclusion of the enterprise that actually developed the intangible asset.100
The third feature identified in the OECD 2018 report – data and user participation is the
most controversial and debated of all features.101 The OECD is of the view that data has
allowed digitalized businesses to improve their products and services, leading to
productivity and growth.102 In particular, “data analysis has often allowed firms to extract
more of the consumers’ surplus through pricing and, therefore, increase their potential
profitability”.103 The OECD also identified three prevalent methods by which data is
monetized by highly digitalized businesses. First method is by leveraging on customer
preferences identified through data collection and analysis to sell targeted online
advertisement to customers. The second is using consumer data to improve on consumer
products and marketing activities.

Finally, “data collection and the subsequent

accumulation of big datasets has also supported significant increases in firm value on the
basis of the expected gains from data exploitation”.104 The important point of this feature
in comparison to other traditional business models is that whilst traditional business models
utilize data in improving their products, the digitalized businesses are able to gain increased
economies of scale. Put differently, the digitalized businesses are able to collect and
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analyze a larger and more varied set of data than the traditional businesses at a faster
pace.105

The OECD highlighted the stages that data go through in the value creation process of
digitalized businesses as follows: (i) data origination which involves generation of digital
data from online activities, (ii) data collection which involves collection and storage of
data, (iii) data analytics which involves the processing and interpretation of data collected
in order to generate economic value, (iv) knowledge base which involves accumulation of
information from data processed, which then becomes the basis for economic value
generated in the process, and (v) business decision making based on the knowledge
obtained from the processed data.106
The OECD’s view on the relevance of data is also shared by many academic writers and
stakeholders. Bal noted that: “data has become a key economic driver around the globe. It
is frequently said that data is the new gold or the lifeblood of the digital economy. As
companies face unprecedented demands from consumers and constant needs for product
innovation, they are looking to their data to power strategic decision-making that can solve
challenges”.107 However, there is no consensus on which of the processes identified in
OECD’s value chain creates significant value for a corporation which would give rise to
source taxation. Larking noted that “a commonly expressed view is that raw data has no
value – it is its analysis and processing that generates value”.108 Similarly, Bal argued that
user data ought to be considered simply as raw materials which has no value unless
processed with technology or algorithms developed by digitalized businesses. The author
submitted that “without skilled people, data is of no value”.109 Brauner and Pistone had a
different opinion when they argued that “the processing activity per se does not generate
much value, because it only gathers and reclassifies data using apposite servers and
statistical software, the final output being information that was already present, although
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not clearly identifiable, in the data forwarded”.110 Petruzzi and Koukoulioti supported the
view that user data play a significant role as a value driver in digitalized business models,
but observed that the role of user data and extent of their contribution to value creation is
not clear or easily quantifiable.111 According to the scholars:
“The indisputable role of user data and participation, as
value drives for digital businesses, as well as the manner and
degree of their contribution to creation of value, do not
appear to be clear or easily quantifiable. This difficulty
derives from both the diversity of highly digitalized business
models, which consequently permit the involvement of users
in the value creation process by various means, as well as
from the interaction each user opts to have with a particular
digital product”.112

In the same manner as data, the OECD identified user participation as a dominant feature
of highly digitalized businesses.113 The OECD noted that obtaining and analyzing internal
data is not new as it had been the practice in the traditional economy. However, this
practiced has changed following digitalization, because “users now play an increasingly
significant role; their data being analysed by businesses to gain insights about markets and
demand trends”.114 The distinction made by the OECD between data analysis in the
traditional economy and what is applicable in the digitalized economy is that while the
former relies on internally generated data, the latter relies on external user data with the
user supplying the data either actively or passively.115 Bal however disagrees with this
analysis. In his view, user data had always contributed to traditional businesses models.
For Bal, the only difference is that in the traditional business models, user data is limited
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and captured in the jurisdiction where the users reside, while the latter is global in scale
relying on user participation from multiple countries.116

Whilst users contribute data actively by voluntarily submitting data through activities like
bookmarking pages and posting contents, user data may also be collected without any
direct involvement of the user for example through cookies or location trackers.117 Broadly
speaking, user data is valuable to digitalized businesses as it enables them to create
customize and improve their products and services to ensure personalized experience for
its users.118 In addition, the OECD noted that user-generated content creates value for
businesses through traffic, product trust building (through reviews and ratings),
advertisement, and in some instances, they represent the core business of the digitalized
corporation.119

There is agreement amongst scholars that user data is crucial in the value creation process
of digitalized businesses.120 The OECD and some commentators hold the view that the role
of user data in the value creation process would vary depending on the nature of the
business model.121 The area of divergence among most scholars is to what degree user data
is relevant in the value creation process, whether the value so contributed should be taxable
as business profit and if so, how the data can be captured for the purpose of effecting source
taxation. Bal noted that not all users contribute to value creation and that the number of
users should not be measured to the number of accounts. According to Bal, the extent of
user participation in the platform created by digitalized businesses should be accounted for
in the value creation process.122 Bal also raised the challenges that touch on how to
determine a user’s location for income tax purposes, and how relief can be granted to
digitalized corporations for losses caused by negative user contents.123
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Koukoulioti commented on the difficulty in measuring the value of user data that
contributes to creating value for digitalized businesses and noted that each business model
would have to be evaluated independently.124 The OECD’s 2018 interim report recognized
that there is no consensus among countries on the precise role of user data and participation
in the value cycle of digitalized businesses.125 According to the OECD, there are two broad
views in this regard. The first view is that user data and participation is a key driver of
value creation for digitalized businesses because it enables the businesses to sell targeted
advertising, increases the value of businesses’ platform, and builds brand trust, reputation
and growth.126 The second does not agree that the “value” created by users should be
activity which gives rise to taxable profit for digitalized corporations. This view holds that
since users mostly use the platforms of digitalized businesses without charge, the
transaction between the users and the businesses is in the nature of trade by barter, a type
of transaction that is rarely captured by most income tax systems.127 As at date there is no
general consensus on the actual role of user data in the business model of highly digitalized
businesses.

Types of digitalized businesses
In the OECD report 2015, the OECD identified four different kinds of digitalized business
models all characterized by their ability to scale, rely on intangibles and commercialize
user data. These business models are considered briefly below.

3.3.1

Multi-sided social networks

Multi-sided social networks are digital platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn
that provide an avenue for some interaction amongst users. As noted by the OECD, multisided social network platforms have two objectives - first to provide a digital space for
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users to interact, connect and share information usually without charge.128 Secondly, multisided social networks enable customers to use their platform in advertising their products,
sometimes taking advantage of data contributed by other users. Although different, the two
objectives highlighted by the OECD are complementary in the sense that data of users of
the platform provide market research resources for advertising customers.129

The equivalent of multi-sided social networks in the traditional economy are advertising
media such as the television or radio commercials.130 Just like the social networks,
traditional advertising media “aim to foster a community of users”.131 However there are
a number of differences, the most relevant for the purpose of this paper being the ability of
digitalized businesses to scale without barriers and operate in multiple jurisdictions without
a physical presence.132

3.3.2

Reseller of goods

This category of businesses engage in the traditional sale of goods to final consumer, but
in this case, sale is facilitated through a digital platform. In this model, the digital platform
which could be in the form of a website or an app is used to either circumvent having a
physical location, or in addition to having a physical location.133 Amazon is a good
example of this business model.

The difference between a digital reseller and the traditional reseller lies mainly in the
impact of technology in the business models of digitalized corporations. For instance,
resellers have the ability to collect consumer data when they interact with their digital
platform either actively or passively. The data collected is subsequently utilized in
improving products, directing marketing activities to specific customers and engaging in
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product pricing and differential pricing.134 This can be distinguished from the blanket
marketing strategy employed by traditional resellers which are usually targeted at a more
general consumer base.135 This difference calls into question the role of user data in the
value chain of digitalized businesses and its consequence for allocating taxing right.

Similarly, whereas a traditional reseller is constrained by geographical location to a limited
market at a time, the digitalized reseller using technological platforms can directly reach
and cater for the needs of a global supplier and customer base.136 This is consistent with
the “scale without mass” feature of digitalized businesses, a feature that has rendered the
physical PE threshold inefficient.

3.3.3

Ride-for-hire

A ride-for-hire business model is a type of digitalized business that “creates value by
matching drivers and passengers so that they can complete a ride on a pay-as-you-go
basis”.137 This is achieved through digital platforms (usually an app) through which
passengers can book a ride with drivers registered with the ride-for-hire company.138 The
ride-for-hire companies do not own vehicles (drivers own their own vehicles) but earn
commission from revenue earned by drivers from rides.139

The closet comparable business with the ride-for-hire is the traditional taxi business. Whilst
there are some similarities in the two business models, the OECD pointed out some very
significant differences. First, the presence of a digital platform in the business model of
digitalized businesses (in this case, an app) provides an opportunity for these businesses to
gather profiles of both drivers and passengers. The profiles of drivers are subjected to
rating by passengers (and vice versa) after each ride.140 The ratings provide quality
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assurance that adds significant value to ride-for-hire company’s in the sense that while
traditional taxi riders can pick up passengers based on demand and supply, in addition to
demand and supply, only drivers with positive rating can operate in the platform provided
by the ride or share company.141

Second, technology provides ride-for-hire businesses with far greater scale than their
traditional taxi contemporaries.142 This is so because the ride-or-hire corporation only need
its app and limited management operations or employee workforce to operate. The OECD
put this feature succinctly as follows: “Ride-for-hire companies are able to build consumer
bases through the transmission of data without the presence of employees or management
in non-headquarter jurisdictions”.143 In contrast, traditional taxi riders need full managerial
and logistic operation within each jurisdiction which reduces their ability to scale.

3.3.4

Cloud computing

The OECD recognized that unlike most digitalized businesses cloud computing has no
equivalent or comparable business in the traditional economy.144

Cloud computing

businesses provide value to only digitalized businesses and this it does by enabling these
businesses host their operations on its cloud-based servers.145 As noted by Rossi: “cloud
services are virtual, flexible, accessible from anywhere by one or multiple users and
chargeable or rendered for free”.146 Cloud computing companies provide services such as
provision of virtual servers, storage services, data warehousing and management, etc. As
noted earlier, cloud computing business is the only novel digitalized business model
considered by the OECD.
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Concluding comments
It has been demonstrated so far that the digitalized businesses are substantially different
from the traditional businesses and thus much more advanced. While the current PE rule
possesses a predominantly physical character, the above features and examples of
digitalized businesses evinces the intangible and multi-jurisdictional nature of digitalized
businesses. The key feature and examples of digitalized businesses discussed above also
highlights the new role of user data in the value cycle of digitalized businesses, and the
relative ease with which business profits in the market jurisdiction can be reduced or
completely extinguished for lack of sufficient physical nexus. In the next section, this
paper reviews the options proposed for bringing digitalized businesses within the tax net
of market jurisdiction and debates surrounding those proposals.

4

CURRENT PROPOSALS TO THE DEAL WITH THE CHALLENGES OF
THE DIGITALIZED ECONOMY
Introductory comments

Broadly speaking, there are two category of options that have been explored for taxing the
digitalized economy. The first category consists of efforts made to adapt existing treaty
principles in order to substantially cover the peculiar features of the digitalized economy.
These consist of Action 1 of the OECD BEPS project and the EU’s proposal for a digital
PE. The second category is the EU’s proposal for digital service tax and unilateral digital
taxes imposed by some EU and non-EU states to tax the digital economy outside the treaty.
These proposals are discussed in detail in this section.

4.1.1

Proposals in Action 1 of the OECD BEPS project

The OECD’s BEPS project is the most robust work currently being undertaken for the
purpose of finding solutions to the challenges of the digital economy. It is necessary to
state at this point that the initial objective of Action 1 of OECD’s BEPS project was not to
redefine the rules for allocation of taxing rights. However, this project took a somewhat
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broader direction because of the clamour for review of taxing rights predominantly from
countries where a large number of customers to digitalized businesses are resident.147

While considering options for redefining the basis for allocation of taxing rights, the OECD
holds the position that it would not introduce rules to “ring fence” the digitalized business
models from the rest of the economy148 as digital transformation has not changed the
fundamental nature of core activities that businesses carry out to generate profits.149 This
is the indication that the OECD’s aims to introduce proposals that would be consistent with
existing principles. Accordingly, the proposals currently being developed by the OECD are
intended to apply broadly, which naturally would be achieved through tax treaties. Whether
this would be achieved and if so, to what extent, would become apparent from an analysis
of the issues that have been raised so far regarding the options proposed by the OECD.
However, before delving deeply into these options it is useful to review the OECD’s overall
objective of allocating taxing right based on value creation.

4.1.1.1 The concept of value creation
Actions 1 and 7 of the OECD BEPS projects embody the OECD’s analysis of the
significant issues regarding the inadequacy of the PE concept. Specifically, Action 1
focuses on addressing the tax challenges raised by the digital economy, while Action 7
focuses on preventing artificial avoidance of PE status through such tactics as using a
dependent agent. Given that the focus of this work is on the impact of digitalization on the
PE threshold, this paper will focus its analysis on Action1. In all of the BEPS Action plans,
including Action 1, the OECD’s overreaching objective is to align place where profit is to
be taxed with place where value is created.150 Whilst some commentators have argued that
value creation have always been a dominant consideration in international tax policy151,
the concept only gained popularity following OECD’s BEPS project.
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Although value creation features very dominantly in the current debate on taxation of the
digital economy, the term was not defined by the OECD, and its precise meaning is another
source of debate for many commentators.152 According to Bal, “the ambiguity of this term
is the reason for its enormous popularity: everyone agrees that taxation should be in line
with value creation and everyone has their own view of what it means. In other words, we
agree to disagree”.153 It is also uncertain if the concept of value creation is a new rule for
allocating taxing rights or a derivate of the existing principles of international taxation.
Interestingly, the OECD does not refer to the historical primacy of residence taxation and
its relationship with taxation based on value creation. The OECD only noted that “the
concept of value creation is currently not captured by existing tax framework”.154 However,
the OECD’s position is still very much debated. According to Sapirie: “nexus for direct
taxation has historically been based primarily on where value is created”, suggesting that
the value creation principle is consistent with source and residence basis of taxation.155 In
a somewhat contrary view, Petruzzi and Koukoulioti noted that: “the concept of value
creation seems to act as a new benchmark for allocation of taxing rights”.156 Christians held
a similar view arguing strongly that allocation of taxing rights have never been based on
value creation but a question of political agreement. According to Christians:
“Of course, the international tax system has occupied itself
for approximately a century in ascertaining which country
ought to have a primary right to tax a given income item or
stream. However, the goal of identifying this primary right
has never really been about ascertaining where value is
created. It has instead always been about creating a set of
rules by which competing taxing authorities – each
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understood by all to be equally justified in imposing a tax on
a given income item – would agree to give way to the other
so as to prevent double taxation”.157

One other problem that arises from taxation based on value creation is the imprecise scope
of the term. The scope of value creation seems unlimited, as almost any location can be
regarded as having contributed value in some way. According to Bal: “almost any location
can be considered as having contributed to value creation in some way. For a country with
strong customer base, value creation will take place in the market jurisdiction (destination
principle) and such a country will advocate for principles that will allocate income based
on the location of customers. A developing country with low-cost production factors will
support value creation in line with production not consumption (origin principle)”.158 This
view was also expressed by Morse who noted that:
“The idea of “local market feature” illustrates the tension in
the concept of value creation. This could include customer
location (a feature of market countries, often developed
countries) but could also mean location savings (often a
feature of developing export countries). As another example,
value creation allocates risk to parties who “exercise
control” over the risk. It refuses to allocate risk based on
financial capacity but does not fully specify what factors are
relevant”.159

Consequently, as it stands, there is no universal conclusion on whether or not value creation
is a concept based on the origin principle (which is the extant principle in international tax
jurisprudence for source taxation), or the destination principle. This raises significant
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problem regarding how value creation can be conceptually harmonized with existing
international tax rules in order not to ring-fence the digital economy.
Another view that has been expressed about the OECD’s value creation objective is that
value creation is a myth. This view was articulated in Christian’s work. According to the
scholar, allocation of taxing right is strictly a distributive exercise anchored on political
will, and not based on any economic value. The scholar argued that taxation based on value
creation proceeds from a false assumption that income is capable of fragmentation.
According to Christians: “it is incontrovertibly wrong to think that a dollar of income that
depends on a seamlessly symbiotic global economic order can somehow be re-fragmented
and correctly assigned to one or another jurisdiction as a technical or economic matter”.160
The scholar also argued that the impossibility of fragmentation of income is manifest from
the historical work of the economists who birthed the current principles for allocation of
taxing rights. Christians argued that:
“The economists posited that the tax base, as a product of
economic activity ought to be divided not on the basis of
taxpayer’s political or social connections to a country, but by
their economic interaction with and within it, which were to
be identified by, inter alia, locating the origin (source) of
various income streams.

Yet in the very process of

articulating this idea, the economists readily admitted in
many cases – perhaps a majority of cases – the idea of origin
would simply confound economic analysis.

To the

economists, it was all too clear that assigning origin would
be scientifically impossible: many types of income would
have several origins, and the whole would be fundamentally
indivisible into parts. There are too many variables, and too
much interdependence among them, to extract a precise

160

Christians, supra note 157 at 3.

29
origin for each portion of a dollar of income earned in a
global economy. The economist therefore concluded that the
division of the global income tax bases would be a question
of political feasibility, and not science”.161
There seem to be some merit in the Christian’s argument. Indeed, the argument that income
of a corporation is a whole and fragmentation is scientifically impossible is evident in the
current debate about the true scope of value creation. It would be recalled that the Bal had
argued that “almost any location can be considered as having contributed value in some
way”. Accordingly, allocation based on value creation would give rise to tracing income
to multiple jurisdictions. Further, the debate regarding the role of data in the value cycle
of digitalized corporations indicates the nature of issues that arise with “fragmentation of
value”. The question remains: how can value derived from a particular user in a particular
jurisdiction be captured and delineated for tax purposes? It could be argued that the
inability to determine the precise role of data and user participation in value creation may
be a consequence of a false assumption that economic value of a corporation is capable of
fragmentation. As would be disclosed in the course of this paper, the nexus and attribution
rules proposed by the OECD attempted to address this uncertainty, but even this effort is
not free from its own criticism.

Although the OECD has dedicated significant resources to defining how value is created
in the value chain of digitalized businesses, there is a more fundamental question of what
value creation actually means and how it could be viewed holistically alongside other
concepts in international tax. The fact that the concept is susceptible to various
interpretations makes it less reliable and it also would tend to generate disputes among
countries. Morse suggested that the meaning of value creation would be shaped by interest
based on the interested parties’ incentive to favour their jurisdiction through either (i)
participation and contributions to OECD work, (ii) unilateral definition of the term in
domestic law, and (iii) treaty-based dispute resolutions.162 This would inevitably generate
161
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conflicts not just on the definition of value creation but also on other distributive provisions
in treaties. More so, it presents a potential risk for double taxation because countries can
interpret the concept to impose corporate tax on non-resident digitalized corporations by
holding on to the value creation mantra. Hey put this concern succinctly as follows:
“Countries, which, given their contribution to value creation,
adopt the position that they [do] not have the appropriate
taxing rights invent new taxes. This has already happened
in India and been discussed at an EU level. The main drivers
of this are the discovery of the significance of the market as
well as of consumer data as a new form of natural resource
that can be exploited by data mining by way of monopolistic
networks. In addition, if value creation results in investment
shifting rather than profit shifting, this could motivate
countries suffering from the effects of investment shifting to
introduce new taxes. The resulting defensive measures of
countries affected by such new taxes are a likely
consequence, which also give rise to the risk of new double
taxation”.163

This concern is amplified by the fact that almost anything can pass as contributing to value
creation. There is therefore no gainsaying that the concept of value creation needs to be
reexamined as it would most likely undermine the OECD’s efforts towards setting out
treaty-consistent rules for taxing the digital economy.

Having reviewed the controversy surrounding taxation based on the concept of value
creation, this paper will now review the options proposed by the OECD for taxation of the
digitalized economy.

Johanna Hey, “Taxation Where Value is Created and the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
Initiative” (2018) 72:4/5 Bull Int Tax at 3.
163

31
4.1.1.2 The OECD’s digital nexus and profit allocation proposals
The OECD identified three main policy challenges posed by the peculiar features of
digitalized businesses to direct taxation.164 These challenges are: (i) nexus, (ii) data, and
(iii) characterization.
Nexus refers to two main issues; the reduced or extinguished relevance of a physical
connection as well as the increased impact of user participation in the business of
digitalized corporations.165
As noted previously, the OECD recognizes that digitalization has increased “the flexibility
of businesses to choose where substantial business activities take place, or to move existing
functions to a new location, even if those locations may be removed both from the ultimate
market jurisdiction and from the jurisdictions in which other related business functions
may take place”.166 The issues of nexus raises specific concern about the PE threshold in
Article 5 and the attribution rules in Article 7. In addition, the OECD recognized that the
user data and participation adds value to digitalized businesses in a manner which differs
significantly from the traditional economy, and noted the need to consider policy changes
to reflect the role of user data and participation.167 Data raises the question of whether
normatively, user data should create a taxable presence in the jurisdiction where it was
gathered and if so, how such data should be characterized and valued for tax purposes.168
The OECD noted that “it may be challenging for the purpose of an analysis of functions,
assets and risks, to assign an objective value to the raw data itself, as distinct from the
processes used to collect, analyze and use that data”.169 The crux of this challenges lies on
determining the economic value of data and the appropriate place where value is created
for the purpose of imposing tax on income associated with that value.170 Characterization
refers to the difficult question of determining how to characterize payments made for
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certain digitalized corporations for tax purposes.171 For example, the OECD highlighted
the difficulty in determining if payments made to a cloud computing service is royalty, fees
for technical services or business profits.172

With respect to nexus, the OECD held the view that the best solution is to create a new
threshold for digitalized businesses.173 Accordingly, the OECD identified three options that
could be adopted to address the challenges of the digitalized economy. These options are:
(a) a significant economic presence, (b) withholding tax, and (c) equalization levy. 174 These
options will be addressed seriatim. As noted earlier, the OECD intends that these options
would align taxation with value creation relying on user, data and technology as the
underpinning economic value indicators.

4.1.1.2.1 Significant economic presence
The proposed significant economic presence nexus seeks to allocate taxing right to the user
or market jurisdiction when a foreign enterprise has a significant economic presence on the
basis of factors that indicate a sustained economic interaction with the jurisdiction through
digital media.175 The OECD proposed three factors, a combination176 of which would be
relevant in determining if a corporation has met the level of digital economic presence that
justifies tax liability in the country where it maintains such presence to wit – (i) revenue
factors, (ii) digital factors, and (iii) user-based factors.177 A combination of these factors
serve to demonstrate a nexus between the income generating activities of the non-resident
business and its digital presence in the users’ country.
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The revenue-based factor refers to the level of revenue received by a digitalized business
from the jurisdiction of its users at a given time. This factor is premised on the assumption
that the value of users and user data is reflected in the revenue of the foreign digitalized
corporation.178 According to the OECD: “because user data serves to enhance the value of
the services an enterprise offer, a strong user network (and the attendant user data) is likely
to result in enterprises either selling more or enterprises charging more for its core
products/services, or both”.179 The OECD considered that the scope of this factor should
be broadly defined to cover revenue generated from transactions concluded by non-resident
enterprise remotely with customers resident in the relevant jurisdiction.180 In order to
reduce administrative and compliance burden, the OECD recommended a fixed and
significantly high revenue threshold. For the same purpose, the OECD also recommended
that countries implement a mandatory registration system for highly digitalized businesses
to avoid administrative cost of monitoring remote sale activities of this corporations.181
However, the OECD did not recommend any mechanism for ensuring registration by
digitalized corporations given that they are outside the territorial jurisdiction of the tax
authorities of the market country.

The digital-based factor seeks to define the significant economic presence nexus by using
automation as a test for digital presence. Thus, where a non-resident digitalized business
engages with users in a jurisdiction through digital means, the digital means would give
rise to sufficient digital presence.182 The OECD’s example of sufficient digital factors are:
the existence of a local or specialized domain name on which the local site targeted at the
in-country customers would be hosted, the existence of a digital platform such as websites
or other digital platforms through which goods, services or an interactive platform are
offered to in-country customers, or the existence of local payment options for receiving
payments from in-country customers.183
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The final factor that could be relevant in determining a significant economic presence is
the degree of relevance of users and user data in the business of the non-resident.184 The
OECD recommended regular conclusion of contracts and volume of data collected by the
non-resident business as digital factors that would be relevant in determining whether a
significant economic presence exists or not.185 In addition, the OECD proposed the option
that the monthly active users on the digital platform that are “habitually resident in a given
country in a taxable year” should be considered as reflecting the level of penetration in the
economy of the jurisdiction. The phrase “habitually resident” was not explained further by
the OECD. In the author’s view, the phrase is ambiguous and can be interpreted absurdly
in some cases. For instance, does it mean that a person who regularly enters and leaves a
jurisdiction and during each stay qualifies as a part time resident can be included in
computing monthly active users in a jurisdiction even when they are not at the relevant
time resident in the jurisdiction? This is not very clear from the OECD’s report. There is a
need to further clarify the phrase in other to ensure that it is not misunderstood.

Dhuldhoya noted that there are some similarities between the significant economic
presence threshold and the traditional PE. According to the commentator, the requirement
for certain local elements including “local domain names, a local website, and user-based
factors that take into account contracts with local customers” all indicate a significant
connection with the market jurisdiction.186 This makes this option the most consistent with
the underlying principle that taxes should be based on sufficient interaction with the
economy of a country.

Notwithstanding, the significant economic presence test has been criticized by
commentators on different grounds. The first criticism worthy of note is the OECD’s
reliance on user data in the significant economic presence. It has been argued that reliance
on raw data to establish a digital threshold does not align with value creation. This
184
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argument is premised on the view that raw data has no value and that it is rather the
algorithms and remote people functions that give rise to analysis and processing of the data
that create value.187 In this regard, Bal submitted that:
“data is another input in business processes. It should be
treated no differently than raw materials and inventories.
Companies receive data sets, process them and feed them
into these algorithms to generate insights about customer or
competitor behavior. Without skilled people, data is of no
value. To the author’s best knowledge, there have not been
any proposals focusing on taxing businesses inputs. It is
generally recognized that inputs need to be converted into
outputs, these outputs need to be marketed, sold and if these
operations result in any profits, these profits should be
subject to tax. The aim of corporate tax systems is to tax
these profits. If the existing tax law has loopholes and
prevents an effective taxation of company profits (for
example, because the company is not resident in any
jurisdiction or takes advantage of hybrid instruments), these
loopholes should be addressed rather than shifting taxation
to the input side”188

Another criticism of the digital threshold pertains to its enforceability. One challenge with
the option is that the factors proposed by the OECD for determining the significant
economic presence nexus, especially the revenue-based factor, did not consider the
prevalent difficulty in determining the level of a corporations’ digital presence. Bianco and
Santos noted this very clearly when they argued that: “the procedure to measure the digital
presence of a non-resident company, which could involve the number of customers, the
market share or sales volume, raises important questions, not only because of the need to
187
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establish an objective, reasonable and non-arbitrary criterion, but also due to the difficulty
in monitoring and quantifying the degree of virtual presence”.189 Another critical point for
the significant economic presence nexus relates to the possibility that some market
jurisdictions may not have the ability to enforce necessary registration and reporting
requirements which would enable these jurisdictions determine that sufficient digital nexus
has been created. Hellerstein noted that although the OECD’s digital PE has been
presented to have a legal means of enforcement, there isn’t much said about the
practicability of these enforcement procedures. According to Hellerstein:
“the problem with this suggestion, of course, is the
enforceability of this standard from a practical standpoint,
even though jurisdiction exists as a matter of law under a
virtual PE standard. Indeed, these practical enforcement
issues are ultimate arbiters of our ability to align substantive
and enforcement jurisdiction when substantive jurisdiction
is defined to include value associated with a digital
presence.”.190

Hellerstein concluded his analysis by arguing that the success or otherwise of the virtual
PE would more likely depend on the political will to enforce the penalties for noncompliance.191
Another point of criticism that has been raised in literature is the OECD’s approach of
isolating the digital PE from other distributive rules in its review. According to Bianco &
Santos, “the characterization of a PE in the source state may produce consequences in the
application [of] article 6 (Immovable property), 10 (Dividends), 11 (Interest), 12
(Royalties), 13 (Capital gains), 15(Income from employment), 21 (Other income),
22(Capital) and 24 (Non-discrimination). In this context, Action 1 of the OECD BEPS
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initiative does not address how a merely virtual PE would interact with the other
distributive rules in the OECD Model”.192 Given the absence of a clear understanding of
how these rules interact at this stage, it is very likely that the digital PE concept would give
rise to significant conflicts and inconsistencies in its application, which would eventually
increase the chances of double taxation occurring.
Finally, in view of all that have been noted so far regarding the OECD’s reliance on user
data as value drivers, there is a tendency that digitalized corporations will meet the
significant economic threshold in many jurisdictions leading to high cost of compliance,
which cost may indirectly be passed on to customers of these businesses.

Just like the traditional nexus rules, in addition to a threshold for taxation of digitalized
businesses, there needs to be in place an appropriate mechanism for allocating profit to the
digital PE. This requirement poses a significant challenge regarding the OECD’s proposal
for a significant digital threshold. As noted by Bianco & Santos: “the greatest difficulty
appears, however, to lie in the attribution of profits to a virtual PE, which would involve
simultaneous application of two fictions. These are: (i) the fictitious characterization of a
virtual PE; and (ii) the fictitious independence of a PE for the purposes of profit
allocation”.193 The OECD made a similar point in the following words: “a significant
economic presence associated with little or no physical presence in terms of tangible assets
and/or personnel in the other country is not likely to involve the carrying on of any
functions of the enterprise in the traditional sense. Unless significant adjustments are made
to the existing rules, therefore, it would not be possible to allocate any meaningful income
to the new nexus”.194

The OECD report indicated some proposals that have been considered for mitigating this
problem. One of these proposals is fractional apportionment based on the following steps
– (i) definition of the tax base to be divided, (2) determination of allocation keys to divide
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the tax base, and (3) the weighting of these allocation keys.195 The OECD was reluctant to
adopt this proposal. The OECD held the view that reliance on fractional apportionment
would constitute a departure from the international tax standard of allocating profit based
on the arm’s length principle, and this approach would be contrary to tax neutrality since
it would give rise to different tax results between the traditional PE and the digital PE.196
Despite the OECD’s evident lack of favour for the formulary apportionment option, as
would be seen in the course of this work, the method still stands as one of the options being
considered for profit allocation to the digital PE.

Another option proposed by the OECD is the modified deemed profit method. This option
requires that a digitalized business with a significant economic presence should be regarded
as a physical business undertaken in the consumer’s jurisdiction, and then the profit of the
digitalized business would be deemed by presuming a certain ratio of expenses as being
incurred in the course of the business. The presumed expenses would be determined having
regard to the profit margins of domestic businesses operating the same type of business.197
The difficulty with this approach is the optimistic assumption that domestic non-digitalized
businesses would be comparable to digitalized transnational businesses. One clear example
is that traditional businesses do not invest in data and technology in the same manner as
digitalized businesses. The OECD clearly noted this difficulty but proffered no cogent
recommendation for mitigating it.198

4.1.1.2.2 Withholding tax on digital transactions
The second option proposed by the OECD is imposition of a withholding tax on gross
payments made by domestic taxpayers to the digitalized corporations.199 The OECD noted
that this option could be designed either as a standalone tax, or an enforcement mechanism
for collecting taxes on a net basis where a significant economic presence exists.200 The
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OECD highlighted three major challenges with this process and they are: the difficulty in
determining appropriate methods for defining transactions to be taxed (i.e. transactions
covered), difficulty in determining appropriate methods for collecting the taxes, and most
importantly, the likelihood that gross withholding tax would occasion violations of
international trade and related obligations.

201

In addition, the OECD’s withholding tax

has been widely criticized for the “negative impact of gross revenue”.202 Larking noted the
“inability of businesses with low margins to absorb a tax on gross revenue”. 203 Larking
also highlighted the commonly shared view that withholding tax obligation would have
very negative consequences on young businesses that are in a loss position.204 This problem
calls for real concern because it would create a disincentive for investment in the sense that
emerging business will avoid investing in jurisdictions with a withholding tax.205 There is
also the legitimate concern that the withholding tax may be passed on to final consumers.
The OECD itself recognized these challenges and proposed that withholding tax be used
as a collection mechanism to enforce net-basis taxation.206 This may be an imperfect
solution given the difficulties in collection highlighted by the OECD, but it is a “better
evil” compared to gross taxation.

4.1.1.2.3 Equalization levy
The OECD introduced the equalization levy as a means of addressing the disparity between
domestic traditional businesses and non-resident digitalized businesses.207 The OECD
recommended that the equalization levy would be combined with the significant economic
presence so as to reduce administrative cost and capture only real economic non-physical
presence.208 The equalization levy would be imposed on all sales conducted in a
jurisdiction by the non-resident digitalized corporation, or on all contracts concluded
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through a digital platform.209 The equalization levy is already being implemented by India
and this will be reviewed in a later part of this work.

The criticism of the equalization levy is very similar to that raised against withholding
taxes, which is the negative consequences that arise from taxation at gross, and
inconsistency with trade obligations including the EU’s non-discrimination obligation.
Secondly, as pointed out by Larking, the equalization levy is most likely not a direct tax
within the meaning of Article 2 of the OECD Model Tax Convention and would therefore
not be covered under tax treaties. This would inevitably give rise to double taxation since
there would be no means of giving relief in the same manners as a tax covered by treaty
would have.210 The OECD noted this challenge but suggested that “to address these
potential concerns, it would be necessary to structure the levy to apply only to situations in
which the income would otherwise be untaxed or subject only to a very low rate of tax”.211
The OECD’s suggestion in this regard is curious, particularly when one examines the
suggestion with the mindset of discovering its real purpose. Aside, its “ring-fencing
nature”, the recommendation raises the following question: is the OECD’s consideration
at this point to set up appropriate rules to ensure equitable allocation of taxing rights or is
it to create measures against BEPS. It would seem that the proposal aligns more to the
former because, the OECD’s suggestion seems to be that in cases where income is earned
in a zero or low tax jurisdiction, then the user jurisdiction would be justified in asserting
its taxing right (by imposing an equalization levy), but where the income is earned in a low
tax jurisdiction, then user jurisdiction would not be justified in imposing tax on the income.
This is at best a misalignment of two related but different objectives. In the author’s view,
the equalization levy itself suffers the same defect in that its only policy justification is its
ability to achieve tax neutrality.
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Finally, some commentators oppose the equalization levy because it relies on the
controversial assumption that user data create value.212 As earlier noted, many of these
commentators hold the view that raw data does not have any value, and only processed
data is valuable.

4.1.1.3 The OECD’s new nexus and profit allocation rules proposals
Following the OECD report in 2015 and interim report on Action 1 in 2018, it continued
work to achieve its mandate of reaching global consensus on the appropriate rules and
principles for taxing the digitalized economy by 2020. In furtherance of this continued
effort, in January and May 2019, the OECD released a further public consultation
document and the program of work respectively. The public consultation document sought
comments on some newly proposed nexus and profit allocation rules, while the program of
work, which was released by the OECD after it received comments on the public
consultation document, highlighted the trajectory of its further work on setting out rules
for taxing the digitalized economy. Both documents also elaborated on some issues which
the OECD referred to as the “remaining BEPS concern”.213 This issue which relates in the
main to treatment of income subject to low or zero tax is outside the scope of this paper
and would not be considered.
An interesting point to note in the OECD’s program of work is the fact that the OECD
seems to be much more motivated by the unilateral approaches that some countries have
adopted to tax highly digitalized businesses without a physical presence, than by a need to
ensure adequate and fair allocation of taxing rights. This is evident from the introductory
part of the program of work where the OECD noted that the incentive for the program of
work is to reach a global consensus on how to reallocate income to user jurisdiction, in
view of the “proliferation of uncoordinated and unilateral actions” by some countries that
have enacted statutes outside the treaties to tax digitalized corporations.214 Accordingly, it
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is safe to say that at this stage, the OECD is no longer asking “if” market jurisdictions
should be granted right to tax but “how” market jurisdictions should tax. Additionally, not
much was said about the initial objective of not “ring-fencing” the digitalized economy.

As hinted above, the OECD presented further options for taxing the digitalized economy.
In addition to significant economic presence reviewed in the preceding section, the OECD
proposed “user participation” and “marketing intangible” as further options for the taxing
the digitalized economy.215 These proposals are considered in the succeeding paragraphs.

4.1.1.3.1 The User participation proposal
This proposal underscores the OECD’s view that user data is the lifeblood of digitalized
business models. The proposal proceeds from the premise that highly digitalized businesses
create value “through developing an active and engaged user base, and soliciting data and
content contributions from them.216 Consequently, the main policy justification for this
proposal as highlighted by the OECD is that the value of user data in the aforementioned
businesses is not currently captured in the international tax rules.217
The OECD narrowed the businesses which it specifically intends to capture to three – social
media platforms, search engines and online marketplaces.218 Given the massive scale of
business these digitalized corporations operate, which effectively means that taxing rights
would be triggered in quite a number of jurisdictions with a user base, the OECD proposed
that “additional restrictions based on size of the businesses” should be included in the
mechanics of this formula to minimize controversy and double taxation.219 It is unclear
whether the size of the businesses is merely a means of ensuring administrative
convenience or it is a benchmark for creating a nexus under the user participation proposal.
However, given the reliance on revenue and user data in the significant economic presence

215

Ibid at 11.
OECD, supra note 23 at 9.
217
Ibid at 10.
218
Ibid at 9–10.
219
Ibid at 11.
216

43
proposal, it is reasonable to conclude that the OECD may have intended to adopt the size
of the business as benchmark for establishing nexus.

The mechanics of this approach are such that it requires a part of the profit of the businesses
covered to be allocated to the user jurisdiction, irrespective of whether or not those
businesses have a physical presence.220 The profit allocation rules for this proposal are
designed in such a manner that routine profit of the business is first calculated based on the
traditional arm’s length principle. This amount is deducted from the total profit of the
corporation to determine the corporation’s residual profit. Thereafter, a portion of the
residual profit is attributed to user jurisdictions using qualitative or quantitative information
or a simplified percentage. This process ends with splitting the portion of residual profit
attributable to user jurisdictions among those jurisdictions based on agreed allocation
metrics.221
The OECD’s user participation proposal received significant criticism from
stakeholders.222 Larking noted that the comments reflected “little expectation” of
consensus being reached on the proposal.223 Some of the criticisms condemned this option
as being inconsistent with tax neutrality, in the sense that it would create a disincentive to
engage in the businesses to which it specifically targeted.224 There was also a similar
concern that the OECD would be unduly ringfencing these digitalized businesses from the
broad international tax framework. EBIT and BlaBlaCar’s submission raised the point that
there is no real difference between the use of consumer data in the digitalized businesses
and use of same in traditional businesses. BlaBlaCar noted that “value creation of a
supermarket customer whose consumption habits are known thanks to loyalty cards follow
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the same process”.225 Taxand noted that given the everchanging nature of the digitalized
economy, targeting specific businesses is not a sufficient long-term solution.226 In the same
manner, the Chartered Professional Accountants of Canada advised that the proposal must
be refined to deal holistically with all businesses that have digital elements.227

Another recurrent critical point raised by commentators is the practicality of the attribution
principle proposed for the user participation threshold. For instance, EBIT noted that
digitalized businesses don’t typically keep track of user locations and given this fact
compliance burden on digitalized businesses would be heavy.228 On the other side, the
World Bank Group noted in their own comments that “the approach to identifying the
residual income attributable to marketing intangibles in paragraphs 45 and 46 looks very
challenging for administrations already struggling with the complexity of BEPS
measures”. The World Bank Group proceeded to suggest a more mechanical approach.229

Other commentators also criticized the proposal for being vague and arbitrary. According
to KPMG: “with respect to the user participation proposal, we see substantial risk that it
would lead to arbitrary and distortive results”.230 The arbitrariness of this proposal is
illustrated by the OECD’s “quantitative/qualitative information” or a “simple pre-agreed
percentage” recommendations for determining a corporation’s residual profit.231 The
OECD acknowledged this challenge in its public consultation document, but suggested the
remedy that formulary methods that relies on value of users should be adopted to determine
residual profit, together with a strong dispute resolution component to address conflicts
225
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and double taxation.232 However, as noted earlier, the extent to which user factor can be
relied on in allocating taxing rights is still subject to huge controversy. BIAC for instance
argued that the value of a user’s contribution is not necessarily same as another user
because 10 users may contribute more valuable data than 100 users put together. 233 The
United States Council for International Business (USCIB) argued firmly that “the proposal
based on user-created value are unsupported by economic analysis and do not appropriately
reflect the contributions to value of research and development (R&D) and investment in
capital assets”.234 In the author’s opinion, the fact that arguments on the value of user data
stills persists at this stage raises doubt about the chances of a global consensus.

4.1.1.3.2 The “Marketing intangibles” proposal
Marketing intangibles is a transfer pricing concept that refers to intangibles such as
customer list, customer data, brand name or trade name, utilized in promoting and selling
goods and services in a particular jurisdiction.235 As clarified by the OECD in paragraph
29 of the public consultation document, the term “marketing intangibles’ as used in the
proposal also has the same meaning as in the transfer pricing context highlighted above.236

The marketing intangibles concept seeks to allocate profit to market jurisdictions just like
the user participation proposal.237 However, unlike the user participation proposal that
applies generally to highly digitalized businesses, and specifically to the digitalized
business models listed therein, the marketing intangibles proposal seeks to have a wider
scope to apply to even non-digitalized businesses operating remotely or through a limited
risk distributor structure.238 The OECD noted that the marketing intangibles proposal is
premised on a functional link between marketing intangibles and the market jurisdiction,
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and further illustrated this functional link in two different ways – the fact that the value of
marketing intangibles such as brand name and trade name are created in the market
jurisdiction, and “reflected in the favorable attitudes in the minds of customers. Secondly,
that customer data, customer list, relationships are “derived from activities targeted at
customers and users in market jurisdiction”.239

Just like the user participation approach, the proposal seeks to modify existing profit
allocation and nexus rules by requiring the residual income of the multinational group
attributable to the marketing intangibles to be allocated to the market jurisdiction.240 The
residual income is determined after all other income including income generated from
technology-based intangibles, routine functions, routine marketing activities, and routine
distributions are deducted from the overall income of the multinational group. 241 This
approach is group-based in the sense that the residual profits mechanism from marketing
intangibles would apply regardless of which entity in the multinational group owns the
legal title to the marketing intangible242 Further, the mechanism applies regardless of which
entity perform or control the DEMPE (development, enhancement, maintenance,
protection and exploitation) functions related to the intangibles, regardless of how risk
related to the marketing intangibles is allocated or how profit would be allocated under
extant transfer pricing rules.243 After the residual profit is determined, the profit is then
allocated between market jurisdictions “based on agreed metric, such as sales or
revenues”.244 As rightly noted by Larking, this proposal made no reference to the requisite
nexus for its application.245

The marketing intangible approach was generally commended by many commentators
because it does not target specific businesses like the user participation proposal.246
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According to the World Bank Group, the marketing intangibles proposals avoids some of
the present and future challenges that are associated with distinguishing between
digitalized and non-digitalized business lines and models.247 However, there were still
concerns that the proposal is capable of creating economic distortions.248 Aside this broad
policy concern, the proposal also received significant conceptual criticisms. One
commentator argued that the OECD’s reference to an “intrinsic factual link” as validation
for attributing taxing right to a market jurisdiction over marketing intangibles would
require psychological, behavioral and sociological studies, analysis and proof.249 NERA
Economic Consulting argued that the assumption in the “intrinsic factual link” that brand
name is created by users in the market jurisdiction is erroneous. The commentators
submitted that brand value is a product of “centralized development and management” and
associated risks owned and assumed by the business.250

The proposal was also criticized on grounds of practicability. KPMG asked a fundamental
definitional question to which multinationals are covered by the proposal?251 Is there a
specific size or industry limit? Unless, this is determined at this stage, there may be dispute
as to whether the marketing proposal should apply to a specific multinational corporation
or not. Another challenge is drawing a distinction between intangibles generated from
research and development to which the traditional transfer pricing rules apply and
marketing intangibles that potentially derive value from users. IBFD noted that “singling
out marketing intangibles and their value may be tough to execute in the practice of
developing countries, which often lack capacity and suitable information”.252 IBFD also
noted that valuing marketing intangibles would require corresponding changes in the
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OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines.253 Another important point raised by IBFD is the
challenge in determining how the marketing intangibles proposal would apply together
with existing principles for allocation of taxing rights. Specifically, IBFD asked the very
difficult question of whether the taxing powers of market jurisdictions over marketing
intangibles would prevent entirely the primary taxing right of residence jurisdictions.254
USCIB observed the absence of a loss allocating mechanism in the residual profit method
and submitted that having a mechanism that factors in pre-existing and future losses should
be a mandatory element in the residual profit split attribution mechanics for the marketing
intangibles proposal.255

Finally, this proposal has been criticized for failing to examine the relationship between
the residual profit split mechanics and the existing arm’s length principle. 256 For instance,
failing to consider the business that performs the DEMPE function related to the marketing
intangibles would be inconsistent with the OECD transfer pricing rules. NERA Economic
Consulting noted that the marketing intangibles proposal (and the user participation
proposal) pose a serious challenge to the arm’s length principle by attributing value not to
any activity of the enterprise but to users who are not part of the enterprise, and who do not
have any economic interest in the enterprise.257

4.1.1.3.3 The Significant Economic Presence proposal
As noted by Larking, the significant economic presence is the only nexus proposal in the
OECD’s Action 1 report that was presented for comments in the public consultation
documents.258 The features and analysis of this proposal is exactly the same as addressed
in Action 1 of the BEPS report 2015.
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Although this concept and issues arising have been considered in this paper, two criticisms
that arose from the public consultation document deserve to be mentioned here. First is the
view held by BIAC that the cumulative factors of revenue, digital factors and users, have
no practical relevance as the significant economic presence de facto relies solely on
revenue.259 BIAC went further to criticize the equity of this approach. Commenting also
on the equity of the approach, USCIB stated that the revenue factor is not fair to developing
countries who have a smaller market and would thus be unable to compete with developed
countries.260 The second criticism is the concern raised by many commentators about the
formulary apportionment mechanics recommended by the OECD for attributing profit to
the significant economic presence. It would be recalled that the OECD expressed its
reluctance to adopt formulary apportionment as a profit allocation rule. In Action 1 of the
2015 BEPS report, the OECD stated as follows:
“It is important to note that domestic laws of most countries
use profit attribution methods based on the separate accounts
of the PE, rather than fractional apportionment. In addition,
fractional apportionment methods would be a departure from
current international standards. Furthermore, pursuing such
an approach in the case of application of the new nexus
would produce very different tax results depending on
whether business was conducted through a “traditional”
permanent establishment, a separate subsidiary or the new
nexus. Given those constraints, fractional apportionment
methods were not pursued further”.261

It is therefore interesting that the OECD has continued to look into fractional
apportionment despite the reluctance it expressed in 2015. One reason why this option may
appear to continue attracting the OECD’s attention could be its simplicity in application,

259

Ibid at 519.
Ibid.
261
OECD, supra note 96 at 112.
260

50
especially given the complicated options that have been reviewed so far. As expected, this
option has been criticized by many of the commentators to the public consultation
document. Larking noted that vast majority of criticisms of this factor is the inability of
this factor to consider the differences between businesses and business models.262 Other
commentators criticized formulary apportionment for failing the test of tax neutrality.
EBIT expressed the concern that formulary apportionment would create “an incentive to
outsource manufacturing in high-tax jurisdictions and insource in low-tax jurisdictions”.263
Finally, some commentators have held the view that consensus may never be reached on
the formulary apportionment option. KPMG noted that reaching a global consensus on
formulary apportionment would be difficult because the proposal “would effectively pick
winners and losers among jurisdictions, making it unlikely that single uniform set of factors
could be agreed upon”.264

4.1.1.4 The future of OECD’s work on taxation of the digitalized economy
As noted earlier, the OECD released its roadmap for addressing the tax challenges of the
digitalized economy in its program of work after it received comments on the options raised
in its public consultation document. In the program of work, the OECD presented its plan
for developing a new nexus based on the concept of remote taxable presence, and also
proposed additional profit allocation options that would be analyzed further.265 In all cases,
the OECD stated that its policy objective is to design a nexus for taxing digitalized
businesses in the absence of physical presence, consider using the total profit of the
business as benchmark to determining the taxing right of source jurisdiction and consider
simplified allocation rules different from the existing separate entity principle.266

On the issue, the OECD did not comment further on some of the nexus options it had
already proposed, but noted that in developing a remote taxable presence it would evaluate
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two alternative options: amend the definition of a PE in Article 5 and 7 of the OECD MTC,
or develop a standalone rule establishing an independent nexus, “either through a new
taxable presence or a concept of source”.267 With respect to the profit allocation principles,
the OECD introduced yet another option – the Distribution-based approaches.268 In this
option, a fixed baseline profit of a business would be allocated to the market jurisdictions
for marketing, distribution and user-related activities carried out in the jurisdictions.269 This
OECD anticipates that this proposal will resolve some of the issues raised against the
modified residual profit split method. In particular, the option is perceived to have the
potential to address the arguments associated with the proper pricing of marketing and
distribution activities.270

4.1.1.5 Concluding comments
From the foregoing, it is clear that the OECD’s original intention of not ring-fencing the
digitalized economy has given way to a new objective: reallocating taxing rights to allow
market jurisdiction exercise some right over corporations with remote presence. The reason
for this shift is predominantly a consequence of the unilateral steps taken by some countries
(most of which are members of the EU), to tax the digitalized businesses which has put the
OECD under immense pressure to control “proliferation of uncoordinated and unilateral
actions”.271 Thus, the OECD’s objective is to gain global acceptance by balancing some
taxing rights among the competing interests of the countries with huge markets, countries
that depend largely on an extractive economy, and countries that are home to most of the
digitalized businesses. Clearly, this is not an easy task because the proposals don’t
represent a common interest. It is not an “all win” situation. As noted by VanderWolk:
“allocation is the most difficult issue, because re-allocation will create winners and losers
from a pure revenue perspective”.272 Accordingly, no matter which proposal the OECD
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comes up with, its effectiveness would depend to a very large extent to how much support
it has globally. Whether this would happen remains uncertain at this stage.

4.1.2

EC’s proposals for taxation of the digitalized economy and the multiplicity of
unilateral measures

The EC’s approach to taxing the digital economy is in two-fold. On the one hand, the EC
proposed that that digitalized businesses be taxed based on a taxable nexus described as a
“significant digital presence”. This proposal which was expatiated on in the EC’s “proposal
for a Council Directive laying down rules relating to the corporate taxation of a significant
digital presence”273 (the digital PE proposal) was designed to apply within the framework
of existing tax treaties. The EC recommended that upon approval of the proposal, member
states would include the significant digital presence in their tax treaties with other
countries.274 The second approach was a recommendation for a digital service tax imposed
on digitalized businesses that have a certain user threshold in the EU.275 The EC indicated
in the “Proposal for a Council Directive on the common system of a digital services tax on
revenues resulting from the provision of certain digital services”276 (the digital service tax
or “DST” proposal) that the digital tax is an interim measure which EU countries can adopt
in their corporate tax rules pending the development of a comprehensive solution by the
OECD.277 The EC claims that a unified interim unilateral digital service tax is useful
because it served to harmonize some of the unilateral measures that were already being
considered by some member states. The EC’s objective was to avoid uncoordinated taxes
that could fragment its single market and distort competition in the union.278
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Similar to the OECD’s approach, the EC proposed to enforce taxation against digital
corporations that have sufficient digital presence in EU countries, based on the
understanding that users are value drivers in the business models of digitalized
corporations.279 The EC also indicated that its proposals are based on a need to ensure that
digitalized businesses pay their “fair” share of tax.280 According to the EC, “ensuring fair
taxation of the digital economy is also part of the European Commission’s agenda on a
fair and efficient tax system in the European Union”.281
It is relevant to state at this point that the EC’s digital PE and DST proposal was shortlived as the proposal failed to gain a consensus among the 28 EC member states. 282 The
EC’s proposal for an EU-wide DST failed despite modified proposals from some countries
such as the Austria, Germany and France to limit the scope of the DST to online
advertising. Nevertheless, the EC’s digital PE will be considered briefly in this work for
completeness while the DST would be considered in some details because it forms the basis
for most of the domestic digital tax statutes which will be reviewed in the course of this
work.

4.1.2.1 The EC’s digital PE and profit allocation rules
The EC’s proposed digital PE is very similar in structure and content to the OECD’s
significant economic presence nexus. Article 4(1) of the EC’s digital PE proposal provides
that a PE would exist if a foreign enterprise has a “significant digital presence” through
which it wholly or partly carries on business.283 Just like the OECD’s significant economic
presence, the EC’s digital PE reflects the revenue, digital and user factors proposed by the
OECD. This is evident from Article 4(3) which deemed a significant digital presence to
exist if the foreign enterprise carries on the business of digital services through a digital
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interface and the entity together with its associated entities meet one or more of the
following thresholds:

(a) the proportion of total revenue obtained in that tax period and resulting from the supply
of digital services to users in a member state exceeds EUR 7,000,000;

(b) the number of users of one or more of those digital services in each member state in
that tax period exceeds 100,000;

(c) the number of business contracts for supply of any such digital service concluded in
each member state exceeds 3000.
To attribute profit of a digitalized business to the digital PE, the EC’s proposal opted for a
modified version of the OECD’s AOA in Article 7(2) OECD MTC. Article 5(2) of the
digital PE proposal provides that the profits that are attributable to the significant digital
presence would be those that the digital PE would have earned on an arm’s length basis as
a separate and independent enterprise performing the same or similar activities, in the same
or similar conditions taking into accounts functions performed, assets used and risks
assumed through the digital interface.284 Article 5(3) of the proposal provides some
explanation on how the functional analysis would be performed. The provision states that
in the functional analysis, economically significant activities performed by the PE through
a digital interface would be taken into consideration, and “for this purpose, activities
undertaken by the enterprise through a digital interface related to data or users shall be
considered economically significant activities of the significant digital presence which
attribute risks and the economic ownership of assets to such presence”. 285 Article 5(4) of
the proposal requires that the profit attribution rules should take into account the
economically significant activities performed by the significant digital presence that are
relevant to DEMPE of the enterprise’s intangibles.286 Finally, the EC proposed that after,
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the functional analysis is concluded, the profit split method would be adopted to split profit
between the foreign digitalized business and the significant digital presence.287
Given the close similarity between the OECD’s significant economic presence and the
EC’s digital PE, it is not surprising that the later was criticized for the same or similar
reasons as the former. For instance, Petruzzi & Koukoulioti raised the popular concern that
equating the number of users to the quantum of value created in a given location is
problematic because “not all users contribute equally to a digital enterprise and that
different business models allow for a different degree of engagement and involvement of
users”.288 In addition, these commentators raised some very interesting points that could
potentially have some relevance to other options proposed by the OECD. They noted that
the location of users is very difficult to determine especially for users that often travel to
different locations in a tax year. The commentators raised the possible circumstance where
users could be counted more than once in different jurisdiction for the purpose of
establishing a nexus, and thereby leading to double and multiple taxation of the nonresident digital business.289
Aside the challenges raised about the EC’s digital presence threshold, the EC’s choice of
the AOA as the profit allocation method for the digitalized businesses is another source of
controversy. Blum as well as Petruzzi & Koukoulioti noted that the lack of a physical
presence makes it very challenging to perform a functional analysis on a digital PE.290 The
EC seems to understand this challenge, which explains why it came up with its concept of
“economically significant activities” related data and user based on which risks and
economic ownership of assets are attributed to the SDP.291 Article 5(5) highlighted some
examples of economically significant activities to wit – “(a) the collection, storage,
processing analysis, deployment and sale of user-level data, (b) the collection, storage,
processing and display of user-generated content, (c) the sale of online advertising space,
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(d) the making available of third-party created on a digital marketplace, and (e) the supply
of any digital services not listed in (a)-(d) above”.292 However, this only complicates the
EC’s approach even further because it failed to clarify how these activities which are
characterized by the presence of user and data factors can assume risks and own assets.
Samari pointed out the same flaw in the EU’s functional analysis using the “economically
significant activities” concept as follows: ‘the EU legislator should make an extra effort by
providing the taxpayers with some clear and practical examples of “economically
significant functions performed through a digital interface” in addition to those listed in
Article 5.5 of the proposed EU Directive. Additionally, some further key points remain
unclear: (i) should data be considered an asset in a significant digital presence functional
analysis? (ii) How should the traditional risk analysis framework provided by the OECD
Guidelines be used in relation to data?”.293

Interestingly, Petruzzi & Buriak argued that a functional analysis can be modified to
accommodate a digital PE because users of goods and services provided by digitalized
businesses are unconscious contributors to the value of the digitalized businesses and can
be likened to unconscious employees of the businesses.294 The scholars also argued that
for functional analysis purposes, user data should be considered assets that could be
attributed to the user base.295 Finally, while recognizing that users can’t bear risks, the
scholars argued that risk should no longer be considered relevant in a functional analysis
for a digital PE. It is the present author’s view that the views of Petruzzi and Buriak raise
more questions than answers. First, the analogy between employees and customers is
missing the “control” element that is viewed as the functional integration between a PE
and the foreign enterprise.296 In the absence of this link, it is contradictory to argue that a
user-based PE is part of the digitalized foreign enterprise, in the same manner as employees
of the enterprise in the traditional context. Second, the argument that data is an asset raises
292
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a number of questions: (i) is it processed or unprocessed data that should be considered an
asset, (ii) whose asset is data; that of the digitalized foreign enterprise or the customers,
(iii) is data an intangible asset and if yes, what is the implication of the OECD transfer
pricing guidelines for intangibles in the transfer pricing analysis for data? These questions
are indicative of the complexity that arise when data is viewed as an asset that can be
attributed in a functional analysis.
Although the EC’s proposal for a digital PE has failed to reach the necessary consensus, it
presents an insight into the difficulty in applying the arms-length principle to a digital PE,
especially in the manner set out in the AOA. Luckily, this option is already off the table
in the OECD’s work.

4.1.2.2 The EC’s digital service tax
As noted earlier, whilst the EC proposed for inclusion of a digital PE in the tax treaties of
member states, the EC resorted to a proposal for a unified digital service tax as an interim
measure to protect the EU’s tax base pending when a global solution is agreed upon.
According to Pierre Moscovici, the EU Tax Commissioner, “Member states are becoming
increasingly frustrated at their inability to tax the high volumes of digital activity within
their borders. Some have taken, or plan to take soon, unilateral measures in an attempt to
solve the problem. A combination of fragmented uncoordinated national ‘patches’ and
solutions would negatively affect the single market, raise compliance costs, and ultimately
undermine competitiveness: That is the disorderly outcome we would very much like to
avoid”.297

The legal basis for the DST as indicated in the EC proposal is Article 113 of the Treaty on
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which enables the EC to adopt provisions for
the “harmonization of Member States’ legislation concerning other forms of indirect
taxation”.298 This effectively means that the DST is an indirect tax. Van & Van questioned
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the EC reliance on Article 113 TFEU. The commentators argued that the purpose of a
statute enacted pursuant to Article 113 TFEU is to harmonize existing indirect taxation of
member states. The commentators argued further that the EC’s DST does not harmonize
existing tax because “solely 10 out of 28 EU Member States have implemented or planned
unilateral measures in this field and these unilateral measures are not similar either”.299
By virtue of Article 3 and 8 of the DST proposal, the DST is a 3% tax on “revenue” (not
income) specifically targeted at revenues accruing from: (a) “placing on a digital interface
advertising targeted at users of that interface” (online advertisements on a digital platform),
(b) “the making available to users a multi-sided digital interface which allows users to find
other users and to interact with them., and which may also facilitate the provision of
underlying supplies of goods or services directly between users” (example social media
networks), and (c) “the transmission of data collected about users and generated from
users’ activities on digital interfaces” (selling user data to product sellers and advertising
agencies).300

Online advertising refers to businesses that publish advertisement and promotional
materials through a digital interface for the attention of users. In this regard, Article 3(3)
states that it is immaterial who owns the digital interface, as the entity liable to the tax is
the entity that actually places the advertisement.301 It therefore appears that cloud
computing services that merely own a digital interface without more are exempted from
this definition. It is not clear why this exemption was done especially given that cloud
computing is one of the examples of digitalized businesses which the OECD reviewed in
its 2018 interim report. The second services targeted by the EC’s DST proposal are multisided business networks such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, etc., that own and operate
digital interfaces which allows users to interact with one another while also facilitating sale
of goods and services. The third service captured by the EC’s DST proposal is sale of data
generated from users of the digital interface. For instance, this would be triggered and
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payable by a corporation like Facebook or Google when it sells data obtained from users
to advertisement and marketing corporations. Revenues from these services were
technically referred to in the proposal as taxable revenues, while the service itself were
referred to as taxable services.

Article 4(1) of the EC DST proposal defines the person taxable as any entity that (a) reports
a worldwide revenue of EUR 750,000,000 of out which a total of EUR 50,000,000 must
qualify as taxable revenue obtained from the EU.302 According to Article 4(6), an entity
does not necessarily mean a single corporation; a consolidated group to which the
corporation in issue belongs would qualify as an entity. 303 On this point, Lamensch noted
that the approach undertaken by the EC is inconsistent with tax neutrality because its
specifically targeted not just specific corporations, but also specific services rendered by
these corporations. Lamensch described this approach as “double ring-fencing”.304

Article 5 (1) of the DST proposal sets out what it means for taxable revenue to be derived
from an EU member state. According to this provision, taxable revenue is obtained from a
EU member state if the relevant service was rendered to users in the member state during
the tax period.305 A user is deemed to be located in a member state:
(a) for online advertisement platform, if the advertisement appears in the user’s device
when it is being used in a member state;

(b) for services involving a multisided business network that facilitate underlying supplies
of goods and services directly between users, if the user uses a device in the member state
to access the digital interface and concludes a transaction on the interface, and for others
types of multi-sided networks, if the user has an account opened with a device in a member
state which allows the user to access the digital interface at any time during a tax year;
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(c) for sale or transmission of user data, if the data so transmitted in a tax period was
generated from a user having used a device in a member state to access a digital interface.
This provision signifies the EC’s shift from a requirement for a physical presence and
reflects the popular view that users contribute to value creation in highly digitalized
business models. As noted by Van & Van, “the users are there to create a connection or
nexus between the taxpayer and the European Union”.306 Accordingly, it is irrelevant
whether or not the providers of the taxable services are resident or carries on business in
any EU member state. Another problem identified with the EC’s proposal is the concern
that the 3% tax on revenue does not take into consideration, the significantly diverse profit
margins of the three taxable services.307 This effectively means that the EC’s intention to
target specific businesses to ensure fair taxation was not really achieved.

Article 5(3) sets out the manner for determining how taxable revenues would be allocated
to EU and members states. The provision requires that revenue would be attributed in
proportion of the number of users in the EU, and subsequently in each member state based
on the number of users living in the state.308 How the location of users would be identified
and implications for users that may be located in different places at different times in a tax
year was not considered.

Given the lack of physical presence of the taxable persons in the EU, Article 9 of the DST
proposal imposed the compliance obligation on the taxable persons. Thus, a taxable person
is required by Article 10 to “notify member state of identification that the taxable person
is liable to DST in one or more Member States”.309 Commenting on the effectiveness of
the administrative approach taken by the EC, Lamensch noted that that although there
would be some level of compliance by the targeted digitalized corporations, given their
size and reputation. However, there would be no means to know if indeed compliance was
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complete without incurring administrative costs that would outweigh the revenue which
would ordinarily accrue to the EU member states from the tax collected.310
In addition to such arguments about the limiting effect of the EC’s DST on sovereignty of
EU member states311, enforceability of the DST312, its ring-fencing attributes313 and
recurring criticism of a user-based nexus314, another notable criticism of the DST is the
EC’s attempt to avoid the digital taxes being mitigated or distorted by tax treaties. In this
regard, it is relevant to recall the implication of Article 2 OECD MTC. Article 2 OECD
MTC defines the scope of tax treaties by providing that treaties would apply to all taxes on
income and capital, and substantially similar taxes. The EC attempted to shelter the DST
from tax treaties by designating the DST as an indirect tax, and imposing tax on revenue
as opposed to income or capital. This attempt raised significant criticism from
commentators. Van & Van argued, and rightly so, that the “reason that the Commission
refers to the DST as an indirect tax is, in the author’s view, is because in this way the
Commission wants to steer clear of any negative effect that double tax treaties concluded
with non-EU countries may have on the EU Member States’ power to tax”.315 The authors
argue that indirect tax is better understood as a “cost-increasing tax”, and that the digital
service tax is not a cost-increasing because the tax was never intended to increase the
financial burden of users, or any other person other than the digitalized businesses
specifically targeted. Accordingly, the tax is the digitalized corporations’ tax and not that
of the users’, or any other person.316 The authors further stated that it makes no difference
that the tax was imposed on revenue (as opposed to income) because “attributable
deductible costs have been taken into account given the relatively low rate of 3%”.317
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Similarly, Lamensch argued that indirect taxation can only occur where the tax burden is
transferred by the person paying it to another person.318 In this case, no person other than
the targeted digitalized corporations are responsible either in the interim or ultimately to
pay or bear the burden of the DST. Accordingly, Lamensch submitted that DST is a direct
tax because it is the taxable persons and not the users that suffer corresponding reduction
in income. Lamensch also noted that the DST is chargeable on annual basis, a key attribute
of direct taxes.319 Finally, Lamensch argued that the fact that taxable persons can deduct
DST paid from income taxable under the corporate income tax of member states is a tacit
recognition that both taxes are same or substantially similar and deserving of relief in other
to avoid double taxation.320 In the author’s opinion, the arguments raised regarding the
EU’s categorization of its DST as an indirect tax are valid. The DST has no real features
that would qualify it as an indirect tax. Indeed, under close scrutiny, one can validly argue
that that the tax is at the very least substantially similar with the taxes covered by tax
treaties in line with Article 2(2) of the OECD MTC.321

4.1.2.3 Unilateral measures
As noted earlier, some countries have enacted their own domestic digital tax statutes. The
common theme amongst the rationale behinds these unilateral measures is the perceived
need to protect the national tax base from further exploitation. Some of these countries
applied a somewhat different approach to the challenges of the digital economy (e.g. the
United Kingdom’s Diverted Profit Tax, Israel significant economic presence law, and
India’s equalization levy), other are modelled significantly after the EU DST (these
countries include Spain, United Kingdom, Austria, France). These unilateral decisions are
reviewed below.
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4.1.2.3.1 Israel’s significant economic presence test
In 2016, the Israeli Tax Authority released an official circular to clarify in what
circumstances a non-resident corporation engaged in online activities would be liable to
corporate income tax in Israel under Section 4A of the Israel Income Tax Ordinance.322
According to the circular, a non-resident person would be taxable in Israel for domestic
law purposes if the activities of the person constitutes a significant economic presence.323
The circular indicated that the Israeli significant economic presence would apply without
the need for a physical presence to a foreign business that is resident in a country with
which Israel has not concluded a tax treaty. A foreign resident in a tax treaty country may
also be subjected to the significant economic presence nexus if they have a physical
presence in Israel.324

The activities that would constitute a significant economic presence are mostly digital
factors and they include: (i) number of online contracts between the non-resident and Israeli
customers, (ii) number of Israeli customers utilizing the digital service, (iii) websites that
contain localized features targeted at Israeli consumers, and (iv) revenue that can be
considered to be derived from online activities of Israeli consumers.325 The circular did not
set out any special profit attribution rules, but merely referred to the existing arm’s length
principle in domestic rule for the purpose of determining profit attributable to significant
economic presence. The OECD in its 2018 report noted that it is doubtful if any meaningful
profit could be attributed to the Israeli significant economic presence. 326 In view of the
conclusion reached regarding application of the AOA to the EU’s digital PE, it is the
author’s view that no meaningful profit can be attributed to the Israeli’s digital presence
nexus by applying the arm’s length principle.
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4.1.2.3.2 India’s equalization levy and significant economic presence
India adopted two out of the three nexus thresholds proposed by the OECD in its 2015
report – an equalization levy and inclusion of a significant economic presence in its
domestic tax rules.
India’s equalization imposes a 6% equalization levy on revenue generated from online
advertising by a non-resident corporation in a business to business transaction.327 The levy
is administered through withholding obligations on residents and PEs in India, which is
triggered when a sum exceeding INR 100,000 is to be paid to a non-resident for online
advertising services.328 India’s equalization levy was designed to be outside the scope of
tax treaties since it is not imposed on income or capital.329
The significant economic presence nexus was introduced through an amendment to India’s
Finance Act 2018, and it became effective in April 2019. Similar to Israel’s approach,
India’s significant economic presence is subject to the overriding effect of its tax treaties
and as such applicable only to a non-resident from a non-treaty country.330 The significant
economic presence nexus creates a taxable presence for India’s domestic tax purposes
whether or not the non-resident has a physical presence in India.331

The nexus is

characterized by two thresholds – revenue and users. India’s Finance Act did not specify a
numerical threshold for its revenue or user factor requirements but stated that it would be
prescribed from time to time.332 The profit that would be taxable is that attributable to the
significant economic presence. The legislation did not specify special rules that would
specifically capture the unique features of a digital PE.333 Consequently, India’s significant
economic presence suffers the same defect as Israel’s.

327

Sarfo, supra note 93 at 3.
Ibid.
329
Ibid.
330
OECD, supra note 22 at 138.
331
Ibid.
332
Ibid.
333
Ibid.
328

65
4.1.2.3.3 The United Kingdom’s approach
The United Kingdom (UK)’s first approach to tackling the challenges posed by the
digitalized business is its concept of the Diverted Profit Tax (DPT). The DPT, also known
as the “Google Tax” was enacted pursuant to the UK Finance Act 2015.334 The DPT applies
where (i) there is a circumvention of the UK PE (avoided PE), and where (ii) profits are
shifted from UK using inter-group arrangements that results in excess deduction in UK,
especially in situations where the UK finds that the arrangement is devoid of economic
substance.335 In the avoided PE situation, the DPT is triggered if a UK non-resident
carrying on business in UK earns profit from UK activities which is diverted by avoiding
the existence of a PE.336 Although the DPT’s wide application has the potential to capture
the profits of digitalized businesses that generate income in UK without having a taxable
physical presence, it is essentially designed more as a tax avoidance mechanism aimed at
recapturing profit that would have accrued to UK had the corporation not avoided PE
status.

Consequently, the DPT does not appropriately address the more specific

controversy regarding allocation of taxing right to user jurisdictions.

Following the global tension and agitation for allocation of taxing rights, the UK made
clear its intention introduce a UK DST in April 2020. The proposal was motivated by the
perceived need to have digitalized businesses pay taxes for value derived from UK. Like
the EC’s proposal, the UK DST proposal is an interim measure which would be terminated
when a global consensus is reached at the OECD level.337 According to U.K. Chancellor
of the Exchequer Philip Hammond, “progress is painfully slow” at the OECD level, hence
the need for UK to adopt an interim measure.338 According to a summarized version of the
UK’s Budget 2018, it is expected that the DST will raise about GBP 1.5 billion over four
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years and also “ensure digital businesses pay tax in the UK that reflects the value they
derive from UK users”.339
The UK’s proposed DST is somewhat different from the EC’s DST. The UK intends to
impose a 2% DST on revenues of (i) search engines that generate revenue from displaying
advertisements against information derived from online searches of UK users, (ii) social
media platforms that generate revenue from advertisements targeted at UK users, and (iii)
online marketplaces that earn commissions from sales facilitated by user transactions.340
According to the budget, the UK’s ring-fencing of the aforenoted businesses is based on
the perception that these businesses derive significant value from user participation. To
ensure that online sales that do not necessarily derive value from UK users are not taxed
under the DST, the UK specifically noted that the DST will not apply to general online
advertising or collection of data unless they are within the aforenoted business models. 341
The taxable person under the UK proposal has the same structure as the EC’s proposal but
has some slight differences. Under the UK DST proposal, a digitalized business that
performs any of the businesses mentioned above (i.e. search engines, social media
platforms and online market places), becomes taxable in the UK if it has a revenue from
the businesses that generate at least GBP 500 million. To ensure that start-ups are not
captured, the UK DST will not consider the first GBP 25 million of UK revenue as
chargeable.342 Although not explicitly stated, it appears that the revenue that will suffer UK
DST would be the that derived from the UK users. The UK DST will also have as a peculiar
feature, a safe habour provision that allows business to elect to calculate their DST on an
alternative basis so that loss making businesses would be excluded from DST lability while
businesses with low profit margin will pay DST at a reduced rate.343 The UK proposal also
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indicated that the DST will be deductible in computing UK corporate income tax, but
would not be creditable against it.344

As expected, the UK DST proposal raised concern among many commentators. Burchner
notes that interaction between UK’s DST and other domestic taxes in the UK such as the
UK’s income tax on offshore receipts from intangible property would occasion multiple
taxation on the same revenue unless they are carefully reviewed and harmonized.345 Glyn
Fullelove, Chair of the Chartered Institute of Taxation Committee raised the concern that
it may be practically difficult to identify revenues that would be attributable to UK users.346
Others criticized the tax for targeting digital companies which has the possible
consequence of discouraging investments in the UK economy.347 Accordingly,
commentators, whilst hoping that a global solution is achieved before the UK DST comes
in force in 2020, cautioned the UK to exercise restraint in implementing its DST.348

4.1.2.3.4 Austrian Digital Tax 2020
Just like France, Austria was unhappy with the failure of the EC’s DST and consequently
set out its own DST proposal which would take effect in 2020.349 The Austrian DST
proposal retained some of the features of the EC’s DST but differed in many areas. Similar
to the EC DST proposal, the Austrian DST would be payable on revenue. However, the
Austrian DST is peculiar in the sense that only online advertising services rendered by
online advertising service providers in Austria would be liable to pay DST.350 According
to Mayr, the decision to tax only online advertisement services reflects Austria’s practice
of imposing tax on “traditional” advertising services dating back to the year 2000. 351
Section 1(2) of the Digital Tax Act 2020 defines online advertising to be advertising placed
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on a digital interface including

- banner advertising, search-engine advertising and

comparable advertising services.352

The Austrian DST is a 5% tax imposed on entities that have a worldwide revenue of at
least EUR 750 million, and at least EUR 25 million of revenue derived from online
advertisement services in Austria.353 In addition to meeting this threshold, to be taxable
under the Austrian DST, the entity must also be an online service provider – i.e. a business
entity that provide online services for consideration.354 The online advertising service
provider may render the taxable advertising service directly or merely be acting as an
intermediary in the provision of the service.355
In the same design as the EC’s model, users constitute the relevant nexus for the Austrian
DST. Thus, for the Austrian DST tax to apply, the online advertising service must be
directed at Austrian users.356 A user is a legal person using a device by which they access
a digital interface.357 The Austrian DST is administered by way of self-assessment by the
taxable online service provider. The taxable online advertising service provider is expected
to file annual returns indicating online advertising services directed at Austrian users and
remuneration paid with respect to the services.

4.1.2.3.5 Spain’s Tax on Certain Digital Services
Following the increased pressure on governments to design rules for effective taxation of
digitalized businesses, the Spanish government issued a draft bill named “Tax on Certain
Digital Services” which sought to tax specific digitalized businesses pending global
consensus on the issue.358 The draft bill was issued on 23 October 2018, and approved by
the Spanish Council of Ministers on 18 January 2019. In line with Spanish laws, the draft
352
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would need to be approved by the Spanish Parliament and will become law 3 months after
the approval.359

Similar to the OECD and EC rules, the Spanish DST was premised on the principle that
users in Spain create value for digitalized corporations which value is not subject to
taxation because of the lack of presence of these corporations. The Spanish DST was
designed based on the EC’s DST proposal and has very identical provisions as the
proposal.360 Some of the key provisions as well as the comments regarding the provisions
are set out below.

The Spanish DST imposes a 3% tax on revenues generated from specific digitalized
businesses all characterized by their provision of a “digital interface” which are accessed
and used by consumers in Spain. Specifically, Article 4.5 of the draft bill defines “digital
interface” as “any software, including a website or a part thereof and applications,
including mobile applications, accessible by users”.361 The specific businesses targeted are:
online advertising services, online intermediation service, and transmission of user data.362
The three services have the same meaning as explained in the EC’s DST proposal. However
not all digitalized corporations that offer the aforementioned service would be liable to the
Spanish DST. To be a taxable person within the meaning of the term in the draft bill, it is
expected that the corporation would have a total worldwide revenue of more than EUR
750,000,000 and annual taxable revenue in Spain of more than EUR 3,000,000.363
Interestingly, this is a lower threshold than the EC’s threshold of EUR 50,000,000;
apparently an attempt to capture more businesses within Spain’s tax net.
Similar to the EC’s proposal, the relevant connection for being liable to pay the DST is
availability of users in Spain. For all cases, the physical location of the corporation
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rendering the service is immaterial. Just like the EC’s model, the relevant nexus is the
existence of users in Spain that access the services through a digital interface. Thus, for
online advertising, the Spanish DST would be payable to Spain if the user’s device is
located in Spain. For multi-side social networks, the nexus is that: (i) underlying
transactions are made using a device located in Spain, or (ii) where there is no underlying
transaction, it suffices if the user’s account, through which the digital services is accessed
was created in Spain. For sale of data, the nexus is whether the data so transmitted was
generated by a user in Spain on the digital interface provided by the corporation.364

When a taxable person performs taxable services linked to users in Spain, the revenue
allocable to Spain (i.e. Spain’s tax base) would be determined on a proportional basis
having regards to the corporation’s worldwide revenue and: (i) the number of times
advertising appears on a device located in Spain, (ii) the number of users located in Spain
and total number of users involved in the transfer of goods and services on the digital
platform, (iii) the amount of revenue obtained from users that opened their accounts in
Spain, and (iv) the number of user data that was generated by users in Spain.365 The
proposal failed to identify how these figures would be determined especially given that the
information for its determination is within the sole custody of the targeted corporations. In
recognition of this challenge, Article 10.3 of the Draft stated that if the tax base in Spain
cannot be determined, the taxpayers must calculate same based on “informed criteria”. As
noted by Perello & Carreno, what would constitute informed criteria was not explained in
the draft.366

For enforcement, the Spanish DST adopted a carrot and stick approach. Just like the EC
model, the Spanish draft relies on the taxpayer for enforcement of the DST by requiring
taxpayers to identify as a taxable person in Spain and register in the Spanish tax registry,
and other similar obligations. If the taxpayer fails to “introduce effective mechanism that
identify the location of users in Spain, then the taxpayer will be liable to a penalty of 0.5%
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of the net turnover of the taxable person in a calendar year, with a minimum of EUR 15,000
and a maximum of EUR 400,000.367
The comments on Spain’s DST reflects some of the views that that have already been
highlighted in this paper. Perello & Carreno argued that the designation by Spain of its
DST as an indirect tax is inconsistent with the core meaning of the tax. According to the
commentators, although the tax targets a certain category of services and targeting certain
services is one of the main indicators of indirect tax, the burden of the DST is borne by the
digital taxpayers and not the users.368 Correa, as well as Perello & Carreno observed that
the administrative cost of implementing the Spanish tax would outweigh any revenue gain
that would otherwise accrue to the Spanish government.369 These commentators also noted
that the Spanish DST would occasion multiple taxation of the targeted businesses leading
to economic distortions.370 Further, on the economic distortions that could arise from the
tax especially in the context of online advertisement, Correa noted that the tax would have
a “cascading effect that will end with the tax burden being shifted to the final consumer.
This will cause a competitive disadvantage for user of the digital interface (the SME),
which would have to sell its product at a higher price that can be offered by the company
that owns the digital platform, which would have an unquestionable effect on competition
and competitiveness”.371 Perello & Carreno condemned the DST’s allocation rule arguing
that the mere existence of a device in Spain does not equate income or revenue for the
targeted taxpayer.372 In the present author’s opinion, this point can also be extended to
include the argument that mere existence of user device does not equate value for the
targeted service provider.
In summary, the Spanish DST suffers from all the defects identified regarding the EC’s
DST. It is not clear if these concerns would be addressed or if they can even be addressed
before the bill is passed into law. Further, it remains to be seen how the Spanish government
367
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can apply this tax (if and when the law is eventually passed into law) given that the DST
is likely to be a violation of the government’s existing tax treaties.

4.1.2.3.6 The French DST
France’s DST is one of the most recent attempts at taxing digitalized businesses. The
French Senate approved the bill for a digital tax commonly known as GAFA (Google,
Amazon, Facebook and Apple) tax on July 11 2019373, and the bill was effectively signed
into law by the French President Emmanuel Macron on July 24, 2019.374 Although signed
into law in July, the bill applies retrospectively from 1 January 2019.375 Just like the
Austrian DST, the French DST was motivated by the failure of the EC’s DST proposal.
Accordingly, the French government expressed its commitment to terminate the tax when
a global solution is reached on the appropriate measures for taxing digitalized
businesses.376
Just like other DSTs discussed earlier, the French DST is a modified model of the EC’s
DST proposal. It imposes a 3% tax on the revenue of corporations that render two
categories of services. These are: (i) provision of a digital interactive platform that allows
users to interact amongst each other “including for the delivery of goods or services directly
between those users”, and (ii) sale of advertising space on a digital interface to online
advertisers for the purpose of displaying targeted advertisements to French users, based on
data provided by users on the digital interface.377 The DST applies to companies with a
worldwide annual revenue of EUR 750 million and EUR 25 million of France generated
revenue.378 In line with the EC’s proposal, the French DST is premised on a link between
Teri Sprackland & Stephanie Soong Johnston, “French Senate Passes DST Despite U.S. Tariff Threats”,
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the revenue of the taxable corporation and value contributed by users. Thus, the French
DST provides that the taxable services would be deemed to have been rendered in France
if (i) for multi-sided interactive networks the user concluding the transaction on the digital
platform is located in France or the account of the users were opened in France, and (ii) for
advertising services, the data available to the advertising corporation is data of a user in
France, or the advertising services was displayed to users in France.379 The revenue
attributable to France is the proportion of the worldwide revenue from the corporations
taxable services that are derived from French user, determined by a percentage that is based
on the location of users in France and number of accounts opened in France.380

The French administrative mechanism is somewhat different and unique. The new French
Law provides that the DST would be administered in the same manner as its value added
tax. Specifically, the law in France regarding compliances with VAT requires taxable
persons to make two advance payments which must cumulatively be at least equal to the
amount of tax paid in the preceding fiscal period.381 The French DST law provides for an
exception to this process by leaving it optional to corporations to elect to file a single group
wide tax return.382

The French DST received significant backlash from the United States of America which
claims that the tax is discriminatory because it specifically targets United States
corporations. The United States’ displeasure with the French DST was very evident from
the message posted on Twitter by the president of the United State; President Donald
Trump stating that “France just put a digital tax on our great American technology
companies. If anybody taxes them, it should be their home Country, the USA”.383 The
United States responded to the French DST by investigating the DST to “determine if it is
discriminatory or unreasonable and burdens or restricts United States commerce” under
section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. As part of the investigation, the United States
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proposes to hold a public hearing on August 19.384 There are also indications that the
United States might activate some of the domestic anti-discriminatory tax provisions in its
Inland Revenue Code (IRC). It was reported that the Senate Committee Chair; Chuck
Grassley and another ranking member of the Senate; Ron Wyden advised the United States
Treasury to activate section 891 of the IRC, which allows the United States to impose a
double tax rate on corporations of countries that impose discriminatory taxes on United
States corporations.385 It is not clear which way the United States would go. It is very
likely that the United States would attempt to send a message of its stance against unilateral
taxes by fighting back the French DST, with the best tools in its arsenal, including trade
restrictions and tariffs.

Concluding comments
It has become apparent that the clamour for a digital tax have only two possible endings.
The first possible ending is a global solution fostered by the OECD’s programme of work.
The second possible solution is a variety of domestic DST statutes, and possibly, a
harmonized DST for the EU member states. The author agrees with the view that DSTs is
not the best solution for a number of reasons. First, the designation of the tax as an indirect
tax which is outside the application of tax treaties would lead to unpredictable challenges,
and of course, multiple taxes on the same income stream. Further, there is the unsavoury
possibility that the DSTs would trigger retaliatory responses, just like the kind currently
going on between France and United States. The inevitable consequence may include
restriction in trade, which would effectively hamper global economic growth. The OECD
reaching global solution may therefore be the best way out. This is an optimistic view given
the significant issues and dissent that have been raised regarding the OECD’s proposals.
But there is even a more difficult question that is still being taken for granted: how much
consensus is required for the OECD’s project to be considered successful?
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5

CONCLUSION

The digitalized economy has a posed significant challenge to the existing traditional rules
for allocating taxing rights. A combination of the physical and tangible nature of the PE
concept, and the ability of digitalized businesses to operate without a tangible presence,
has limited the taxable income available over the years to source countries. This concern
did not start with the OECD BEPS project. As noted in the earlier part of this work, the
concern to tax online activities dates as far back as the 20th century as a result of which the
OECD introduced the Server PE concept. The Serve PE introduced by the OECD following
its Ottawa Taxation Framework did not solve the problems of digitalization because it
maintained the physical character of the nexus for source-based taxation. Consequently,
when the chance presented itself again in the OECD’s BEPS project, aggrieved
governments and stakeholders reactivated the push for a change in the status quo. Although
the OEC’s BEPS project did not start off to correct the perceived unfairness with the
existing principles for allocation of taxing rights, it presented a platform for conversations
on this point. To address these issues, the OECD is working on a number of proposals
which would be the basis of a global consensus on these concerns.
The OECD’s proposal has been very controversial. In the author’s view, introducing new
and undefined concepts as justification for seeking reallocation of taxing rights has not
been helpful to the OECD’s project in this area. Particularly, the idea that allocating taxing
right based on value creation does not seem to have a sound basis when one considers the
historical evolution of the PE concept. It therefore does not come as a surprise that almost
6 years after the introduction of OECD’s Action 1 project, the concept has remained
undefined and subject to speculations. The OECD’s objective may have suffered less attack
if was direct in its goals; which is mostly realigning taxing rights based on the principle of
ability to pay. The EU’s projects was very explicit on these objectives and perhaps this
objective would have been a more determinable policy rationale and may have saved some
time in the OECD’s project.

76
There is an interesting contradiction in the OECD’s plans for reallocating taxing right. The
OECD set out with the intention not to “ring-fence” the digitalized economy, but at the
same time recognized that features of digitalized businesses cannot be accurately captured
by existing international tax framework. In other words, the OECD seem to be saying: the
rules are not good enough, but we don’t want to develop new rules that are inconsistent
with existing principles. In the author’s view, this contradiction is a result of the dilemma
being faced by the OECD. The OECD is in a really difficult position because it is faced
with two strong competing interests. On the one hand, there are jurisdictions who have
benefitted and still benefit from the existing principles, and on the other hand, there are
countries that believe they have gotten the shorter end of the stick. Additionally, as evident
in some of the comments noted earlier, there is a tension between the ideal of ensuring fair
taxation; taxation based on an ability to pay and ensuring tax neutrality and administrative
efficiency. As noted by Sapirie, achieving these ideals simultaneously is impossible and
the goal should be to achieve a reasonable balance of the objectives.386
In the author’s opinion, balancing the above competing interests and policy objectives pose
a real challenge to OECD’s ability to gain global consensus. Indeed, when one looks at the
events that has transpired so far, it becomes very doubtful if global consensus can ever be
reached on the issues. This doubt is evident in the fact that countries have decided to take
interim unilateral measures, which means that the OECD may be faced with one option:
develop rules that will allocate more taxing rights to market jurisdictions. It will be
interesting to see how the OECD would achieve consensus and how things would play out
in the international tax law realm in the coming months.
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